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SHAM PETITIONING AS A THREAT TO THE
INTEGRITY OF THE REGULATORY PROCESS
LARs NOAH*
In this Article, Professor Noah examines the problem of
"sham petitioning," the improper use of administrative procedures
by firms in various industries seeking to delay or prevent entry into
the market by would-be competitors. Noting that the Federal
Trade Commission is investigating this problem, the author argues
that a strategy relying upon federal antitrust laws is ineffective in
the face of the broad constitutional right to petition invoked by
firms making manipulative regulatory submissions. Instead, the
author proposes modifications of agency procedures to effect direct
curtailment of unfair delaying tactics. Professor Noah concludes
that only when agencies take greater responsibility for controlling
abuses of administrative proceedings will incumbent firms be
stymied in their efforts to misuse administrative processes to inhibit
lawful market entry by their rivals.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently announced plans
to investigate the petitioning activities of companies in the phar-
maceutical and medical device industries.1 Agency officials expressed
concerns that firms were using frivolous patent litigation and petitions
to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to limit competition and
market entry.2 The financial stakes in these industries are often
enormous, and even relatively short delays in FDA approval of
competing products could prove extremely valuable to a company
with an approved product already on the market.3 Mark Whitener,
Acting Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, noted in 1994
that "there is a trend in this market for increasing intervention by
pharmaceutical firms in judicial or regulatory proceedings," 4 and he
1. See Mark D. Whitener, Competition and Antitrust Enforcement in the Changing
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 301, 307 (1995); F-D-C REPORTS
("The Pink Sheet"), June 20, 1994, at 11; F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Nov. 22,
1993, at 3; FTC: WATCH, Feb. 22, 1993, at 1.
2. See Pharmaceutical Marketplace Reform: Is Competition the Right Prescription?:
Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1993)
(statement of Mark D. Whitener, Acting Deputy Director, FrC Bureau of Competition)
("Another ongoing investigation involves the possible abuse of regulatory processes by an
incumbent firm in order to defeat or retard market entry by a competitor. Judicial and
regulatory proceedings can be the principal hurdles faced by new entrants into
pharmaceutical markets ...."); see also supra note 1.
3. See User Fees for Prescription Drugs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1992) (statement of David A. Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drugs) ("For a drug
that raises $200 million a year in annual sales, assuming an 80 percent gross margin, every
additional month of delay the Agency takes to review an application would cost the
company about $10 million in lost opportunity."); see also Joseph A. DiMasi, The Cost of
Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 107, 125-26 (1991)
(estimating that, on average, drug research and development costs $231 million and
requires 12 years before a new chemical may be introduced in the United States market).
4. F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), June 20, 1994, at 12.
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added that some of these efforts may violate the federal antitrust
laws.
The FTC's current investigation prompts a number of important
questions. Initially, one might ask whether there is any foundation to
fears that firms in these or other industries are manipulating
regulatory processes. In theory, at least, it seems that pharmaceutical
manufacturers could make use of a variety of administrative
procedures to delay or perhaps completely prevent market entry by
potential competitors. As this Article will illustrate in a detailed
hypothetical derived from a number of actual cases, a company with
an approved drug on the market could fend off competition by filing
various objections and petitions with the FDA and other regulatory
bodies. It is difficult, of course, to gauge the prevalence of such
behavior, and obvious differences exist among various agencies and
regulated industries. Nonetheless, as this Article will explain in Part
I, real opportunities exist for sham petitioning in administrative
proceedings, especially when market entry requires some sort of
agency licensing as in the pharmaceutical, transportation, com-
munications, and energy industries.
In light of the potential for abuse of the regulatory process, the
next question is how best to minimize the risk of anticompetitive
manipulation. By default rather than by design, application of the
federal antitrust laws has become the preferred method of response
by public and private litigants. Nevertheless, one might wonder
whether the confidence expressed by the FTC in using the antitrust
laws for these purposes is justified. Because the First Amendment
protects persons' right to petition the government for redress of
grievances, the Supreme Court has conferred broad immunity from
antitrust scrutiny to businesses engaged in legislative lobbying,
regulatory proceedings, and litigation. Although "sham petitioning"
is excluded from this immunity, serious limitations exist with a
remedial approach dependent on the proscriptions of the Sherman
Act.' For example, as this Article will explain in Part II, it is
extremely difficult to establish that a regulatory petition is both
objectively baseless and born of a subjective predatory intent, a two-
part inquiry which raises some of the same difficulties that courts have
5. Id.; see also Whitener, supra note 1, at 307.
6. See infra notes 9-30 and accompanying text.
7. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)). The statute prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade as well as efforts to monopolize trade. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).
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faced in attempting to police the conduct of litigants. Objective
baselessness may be particularly difficult to demonstrate in the ad-
ministrative context because agencies enjoy greater policymaking
discretion than do the courts. Indeed, where the standards for ap-
proval of licenses and applications make reference to undefined
considerations of public interest, it may be impossible to show that a
competitor's objections were objectively baseless.
A number of commentators have recognized these and other
limitations to reliance on the sham exception as a means of addressing
abuses of the regulatory process, yet they have apparently lost little
enthusiasm for the potential utility of the antitrust laws in this area.8
A properly reconfigured sham exception, they contend, will prevent
the anticompetitive manipulation of agency procedures. Whether one
shares these commentators' optimism about the possibility for
achieving doctrinal reform, their underlying assumption that antitrust
provides the best available tool for protecting the integrity of the
regulatory process remains questionable. The antitrust laws, while
perhaps a useful adjunct for combatting the most blatant abuses of
regulatory procedure, can never substitute for active policing by
agencies to maintain the integrity of their own processes.
Thus, although sham petitioning has received a good deal of
attention in the literature, scholars have focused almost exclusively on
how best to modify antitrust doctrine to combat the problem more
effectively. Remarkably, there is almost a total absence of any discus-
sion about more directly targeted controls, whether through rules
governing attorney conduct or other general reforms in administrative
procedure. This Article strives to bridge that gap.
Because the antitrust laws cannot adequately deter anticom-
petitive abuses of the regulatory process, agency procedures must be
modified to address these concerns. Indeed, even if antitrust scrutiny
provided some meaningful deterrent, procedural reforms could
respond to sham petitioning more directly and effectively. Just as
courts have developed special standards of conduct, such as Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to address real or perceived
abuses in the context of litigation, agencies need to assume greater
responsibility for controlling the behavior of participants in ad-
ministrative proceedings. Part III discusses the possible utility of
professional responsibility and certification rules to deter improper
petitioning, but it concludes that direct limitations on opportunities to
8. See infra note 163.
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trigger delay will be necessary. In particular, agencies should impose
greater restrictions on the rights of intervention by third parties.
Although agencies permit and even encourage participation by
persons with financial interests in licensing and other decisions,
neither the constitutional right to petition nor guarantees of due
process require that incumbent firms be given opportunities to block
market entry by competitors.
The decisionmaking activities of administrative agencies and
courts differ, of course, in a variety of respects, and commentators
properly have criticized the tendency to overlay the adversarial model
on regulatory processes. In fact, legislators may intend that ad-
ministrative agencies be more responsive to lobbying by interested
persons even if that makes their procedures more vulnerable to
anticompetitive manipulation. Nonetheless, legislators and agency
officials must guard against sham petitioning when it threatens to
undermine the integrity of the regulatory process. Opportunities for
participation should not become invitations for fraudulent submissions
or other misuse of administrative procedures.
I. THE NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SHAM PETITIONING
As already mentioned, the Federal Trade Commission recently
expressed concerns that competitors in the pharmaceutical and
medical device industries are misusing the regulatory process.' This
Part describes some of the opportunities that may exist for
manipulating administrative procedures in the pursuit of anticom-
petitive ends, first with respect to the drug approval process, and then
in a number of related licensing contexts. Although it is difficult to
assess the frequency of such conduct, there are clear opportunities for
sham petitioning before federal regulatory agencies.
A. Opportunities to Manipulate the Drug Approval Process
The FTC's investigation of petitioning activities in the phar-
maceutical industry suggests that the drug approval process may be
subject to manipulation by "incumbent firms," namely those com-
panies with approved products already on the market. Although the
following hypothetical is only a caricature, it represents a composite
derived from a number of actual examples.'0 For the sake of clarity,
the illustration proceeds chronologically, first describing the drug
9. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10. The names used in this hypothetical are, however, entirely fictional.
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approval process, and then identifying how one incumbent firm could
try to repel potential competition at different time intervals after it
has received all necessary approvals for its own product.
The Food and Drug Administration extensively regulates the
development and marketing of pharmaceutical products. A firm may
not introduce a "new drug" into interstate commerce until the Agency
approves an application for new drug approval (NDA), an action
which affirms that the product is safe and effective for its intended
use.11 On average, more than a decade elapses between the initial
discovery of a new chemical entity and final drug approval.12 To
encourage the development of pharmaceutical products intended for
the treatment of rare diseases or conditions, certain investigational
drugs may be designated as "orphan" drug products and entitled to
special approval rules. 3 Orphan designation for an investigational
drug does not ensure ultimate NDA approval, but it does provide
special exclusive marketing rights for the first company to receive
such approval. There is no limit on how many companies may receive
orphan designation for the same investigational drug, and each may
conduct clinical trials. Once clinical testing has been completed,
however, the Agency can approve only one of these products.
Imagine that Alpha Pharmaceutical Company, the incumbent
firm, requests orphan drug designation for a combination product
("Rx") for possible use in the treatment of a rare form of cancer.
After evaluating the company's evidence that the expected patient
population would not exceed 200,000, the FDA grants Alpha's request
for orphan designation. 4 Assume also that Rx includes two active
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1988); 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (1995). See generally Lars Noah, The
Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from the "Need to Know" About
Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 320-32 (1994) (discussing labeling
requirements for prescription and over-the-counter drugs); Lars Noah, Constraints on the
Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PROD. & ToxIcs LIAB. 139, 142-45
(1994) (summarizing the FDA's new drug approval procedures).
12. See DiMasi, supra note 3, at 125-26.
13. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360dd (1988); 21 C.F.R. pt. 316 (1995). For background
on the orphan drug approval process, see Stephan E. Lawton, Controversy Under the
Orphan Drug Act: Is Resolution on the Way?, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 327, 328-31
(1991); Sheila R. Shulman et al., Implementation of the Orphan Drug Act: 1983-1991, 47
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 363 (1992); Li-Hsien Rin-Laures & Diane Janofsky, Note, Recent
Developments Concerning the Orphan Drug Act, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269 (1991).
14. The FDA may designate one or more investigational new drugs as orphan drugs
if persuaded that such drugs are intended for the treatment of a rare disease or condition.
21 U.S.C. § 360aa(a)(1) (1988); 21 C.F.R. pt. 316(C) (1995). The statute defines "rare
disease or condition" as one which "affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States,"
or one "for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and
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ingredients, one of which happens to be regulated as a Schedule II
controlled substance. Authority over controlled substances resides
with a separate agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
of the United States Department of Justice.' Before clinical testing
of Rx may proceed, Alpha must register as a manufacturer of
controlled substances and receive an annual production quota from
the DEA for the Schedule II component of the product. 6
Once it has satisfied both FDA and DEA requirements, Alpha
undertakes clinical trials to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
Rx. The statute requires adequate and well-controlled studies,
generally defined as independent, double-blind clinical trials.'
Because the results of its studies are favorable, Alpha prepares and
submits an NDA application for the product. After a comprehensive
scientific review of the company's chemistry and clinical data, the
FDA approves the application. Under the statute, Alpha then is
entitled to the seven-year period of market exclusivity reserved as a
special incentive for the development of orphan drugs.'"
One year after Rx is approved, Alpha's competitor "Medica"
seeks approval of an apparently similar orphan drug for the same
intended use. Both companies had received orphan drug designations
for their respective investigational products in the same year. Medica
secured a limited DEA registration and procurement quota in order
to conduct its own clinical trials in preparation of an NDA ap-
plication, but Alpha was the first to receive final product approval
from the FDA. Although Medica submits evidence that its product
would be clinically superior to Rx, Alpha lodges its objection that
approval of Medica's product would violate Alpha's statutory right to
market exclusivity because the drugs are the same as defined under
making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be
recovered from sales in the United States of such drug." 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1988).
15. See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1988)).
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(a) (1988) (listing registration requirements for manufacturers
of Schedule II narcotics); id. § 826 (listing aggregate and individual production quota
requirements for Schedule II narcotics); Western Fher Lab. v. Levi, 529 F.2d 325, 330-32
(1st Cir. 1976) (affirming challenged production quotas for phenmetrazine).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(i) (1995) ("A placebo-
controlled study ... usually includes randomization and blinding of patients or
investigators, or both.").
18. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 316.31(a) (1995).
1995]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the FDA's implementing regulations. 9 The Agency thereupon
rejects Medica's application.
Alpha's own orphan designation is, however, subsequently
revoked because of a misrepresentation about the expected size of the
patient population,.' a misrepresentation brought to the Agency's
attention by Medica.2' Alpha therefore loses its seven-year period
of market exclusivity for Rx because the product is no longer
regarded as an orphan drug. Even so, the NDA for the product is
unaffected, leaving Alpha with the more limited form of exclusivity
afforded approved new drugs that do not qualify as orphan
products-namely, three years of market exclusivity against makers
of generic versions of the drug seeking abbreviated approval.3
Another company could submit a complete NDA application for the
same drug during the exclusivity period if it had performed the
necessary preclinical and clinical testing. Thus, Medica resubmits its
19. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3), (13) (1995) (defining the terms "clinically superior" and
"same drug"). When it promulgated these regulations, the FDA rejected suggestions that
it create a preapproval challenge procedure because it feared that incumbents might try
thereby "to delay the marketing of competitorsv' approvable" orphan drugs. 57 Fed. Reg.
62,076, 62,083 (1992). The Agency explained that, in any case, incumbents could file
citizen petitions to challenge approvals that allegedly impinged on their own exclusivity
rights, id., as some had done previously. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp.
301, 307 (D.D.C. 1987).
20. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.29(a)(1) (1995).
21. Companies sometimes inform agency officials of alleged regulatory infractions by
existing or potential competitors. See Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks,
Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 231 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Sandoz is free to petition the FDA to
investigate these alleged labeling violations."); Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What
Extent Can the FDA Regulate the Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales
Representatives?, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 327 (1992) (describing use of FDA hotline
to report unlawful promotional practices by competitors); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink
Sheet"), July 20, 1992, at 7 (describing FDA policy of delaying final approval of pending
applications until certain compliance issues are resolved).
22. 21 C.F.R. § 316.29(b) (1995).
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)(iii) (1988). The illustration assumes that at least one
of the active ingredients in Rx had been approved previously. Otherwise, Alpha might
have been able to take advantage of a five-year period of market exclusivity. Id. §
3550)(4)(D)(ii). For additional background concerning these complicated provisions, see
Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the
Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269 (1985); James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Phar-
maceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433 (1986). Companies may receive additional periods of
market exclusivity for certain modifications of the product. See 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338,50,357
(1994). Although generic companies could still market copies of the original version, they
might face difficulties in trying to compete against the modified product until the latter's
period of market exclusivity expires.
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application, and, after another lengthy review, the FDA approves the
product. Medica is not initially able to market its product, however,
because Alpha temporarily blocks Medica's full manufacturer registra-
tion and quota applications by filing objections with DEA.24
Finally, when the limited exclusivity period for Rx lapses, Alpha
faces the prospect of abbreviated NDA (ANDA) submissions by
competitors seeking to market generic versions of this product. The
FDA may approve an ANDA if the applicant demonstrates that its
generic product is "bioequivalent" to (meaning that it has essentially
the same rate and extent of absorption as) the innovator drug,25 a
showing that substitutes for the much costlier clinical trials demanded
as part of an NDA to demonstrate safety and effectiveness of the
innovator drug. Alpha, however, attempts to forestall agency
approval of generics by filing a citizen petition asserting general
bioequivalence problems that must be resolved before the FDA can
evaluate any ANDA applications for this class of products. 26 Even
when the Agency is prepared to approve generic versions of Rx,
perhaps after a significant delay while it has grappled with these
24. Until 1995, DEA regulations invited existing firms to object to the applications
filed by new entrants. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.43(a), 1303.32(b) (1995) (amended in part by
60 Fed. Reg. 32,101 (1995)). Some incumbents have delayed entry by competitors through
the use of these procedures. See 58 Fed. Reg. 52,246, 52,247 (1993) ("[Currently
registered manufacturers use the regulatory hearing requirement to deter others from
applying or to delay entry of competitors into their marketplace."); 50 Fed. Reg. 28,045
(1985) (rejecting, after nearly two years of proceedings, the objections filed by Knoll
Pharmaceutical Co., which for 50 years had been the sole manufacturer of bulk hydromor-
phone, to another company's application for registration, and noting that Knoll failed to
raise these same objections in a prior proceeding involving the same drug manufactured
by an allied generic company); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), June 14, 1993, at 12
("Although Houba obtained a recommendation for DEA registration as a result of the
hearing, MD's request for a hearing to challenge Houba's application effectively has
delayed development of another generic methylphenidate by at least two years.").
25. See 21 U.S.C. § 355() (1988); 21 C.F.R. pts. 314(C), 320 (t995).
26. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Shalala, 995 F.2d 1103, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (describing drug company's efforts to challenge the FDA's bioequivalence criteria
for non-systemic drugs); Fisons Corp. v. Shalala, 860 F. Supp. 859, 861 (D.D.C. 1994)
(same); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Feb. 6, 1995, at T&G-12 (describing
incumbent firm's petition to the FDA asserting bioequivalence problems with generic
version of arthritis drug); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), May 16, 1994, at T&G-6
(describing petitions submitted by two companies with approved albuterol metered dose
inhalers (MDIs) challenging the FDA's guidelines for bioequivalence testing and arguing
that generic albuterol MDIs should not be approved without more stringent testing); F-D-
C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Mar. 4, 1991, at 9 (describing Wyeth-Ayerst's success in
persuading the FDA to establish more stringent bioequivalence requirements for
conjugated estrogens); Sari Horwitz, New Law Stimulating Generic-Drug Market, WASH.
POST, June 28, 1985, at B1, B2 (characterizing petition by brandname manufacturer of
Valium as a delaying tactic).
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bioequivalence issues, Alpha may raise specific objections to the
ANDA filings of individual companies.27
If these efforts to prevent FDA approval of generic products
ultimately prove unsuccessful, even though the company did manage
to delay such approvals, Alpha might again attempt to use DEA
processes to preserve its market position. 8 Alpha also might fie
patent infringement lawsuits against the companies marketing generic
versions of Rx.29 Finally, even after these competitors have received
the necessary FDA approvals and DEA licenses, Alpha might try to
convince state formulary committees not to include the generic
products on the list of drugs reimbursable under Medicaid and other
health insurance programs, again in hopes of retaining its existing
market share?
27. See, eg., Upjohn Mfg. Co. v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 480, 482-83 (6th Cir. 1982)
(upholding the FDA's decision to reject Upjohn's citizen petition challenging the Agency's
authority to approve a generic version of ibuprofen). The court commented that "Upjohn
does not contend that the drug is not safe and effective. Instead, it has mounted a
technical assault on FDA's approval of the Boots application, in an effort to preserve its
monopoly." Id. at 484; see also Peter 0. Safir, Current Issues in the Pioneer Versus Generic
Drug Wars, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 335 passim (1995) (discussing recent efforts to block
generic competition); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Aug. 10, 1992, at 6 (describing
incumbent firm's petition to the FDA five days after the FDA approved a generic
substitute).
28. See supra note 24; F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Sept. 20, 1993, at T&G-9
("The [generic] company needs a DEA license and quota before it can begin producing
drug for bioequivalence studies to support an ANDA."); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink
Sheet"), Jan. 27, 1986, at 4 (describing DEA's difficulties in trying to reallocate aggregate
production quotas to account for new market entrants); cf. 50 Fed. Reg. 28,046 (1985)
(providing that when "a new firm takes sales from those of an existing manufacturer, then
DEA decreases the latter's quota by the amount of such sales").
29. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 2553 (1995); Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Lab., Inc., 874 F.2d
804, 805-06 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989); Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.,
830 F. Supp. 869, 870 (E.D.N.C. 1993), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Lawrence M.
Fisher, Drug Makers Will Settle Patent Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1995, at C3.
30. See Barr Lab., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 867 F.2d 743, 744 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing
allegations in subsequently dismissed complaint filed by the manufacturer of a generic
antibiotic that the manufacturer of the original product had engaged in a campaign of
disparagement that included communications with state agencies); F-D-C REPORTS ("The
Pink Sheet"), Feb. 6, 1995, at T&G-12 (describing incumbent firm's submissions to Illinois
and New Jersey formulary committees alleging bioequivalence problems with generic
versions of arthritis drug); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Dec. 19, 1994, at T&G-14
(quoting FTC official's reference to "the possible sham use of state formulary processes
to block approval of competing drugs"); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Apr. 5,
1993, at T&G-8 (discussing allegations by the manufacturer of a generic antihypertensive
drug that the manufacturer of the brandname product had engaged in a campaign of
disparagement that included attempts to convince state officials not to list the generic
version on drug formularies); see also Competitive Problems in the Pharmaceutical Industry:
[Vol. 74
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Thus, an incumbent drug manufacturer may be able to utilize the
regulatory processes of the FDA and DEA, as well as the states, in
a variety of ways to delay and perhaps completely prevent market
entry by competitors. It is precisely this sort of conduct in the phar-
maceutical industry that the Federal Trade Commission recently
identified as potentially abusive and worthy of closer investigation.3
This illustration prompts two important questions, namely, whether
such conduct should be regarded as objectionable and, if so, whether
the antitrust laws provide a meaningful response. To the extent that
courts have restricted antitrust scrutiny in such cases, partly in
recognition of the First Amendment right to petition, this Article
suggests that greater attention should be paid to the procedural
mechanisms available to administrative agencies for protecting the
integrity of the regulatory process.
B. Sham Petitioning Before Other Agencies
Plaintiffs in antitrust lawsuits have accused incumbent firms of
anticompetitive petitioning before several different agencies. Petitions
or objections before licensing agencies are the most common type to
receive antitrust scrutiny. For example, the motor carrier licensing
procedures of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC)-specifically the procedures for registering certificates of public
convenience and necessity-were at issue in California Motor
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited,32 the first Supreme Court decision
to explicate the sham exception. In addition to the ICC,33 plaintiffs
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987) (statement of Senator Metzen-
baum).
31. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Dec. 19, 1994, at T&G-14; F-D-C
REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), June 20, 1994, at 11; F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"),
Nov. 22, 1993, at 3; see also FTC: WATCH, Feb. 22, 1993, at 1 (describing FTC investiga-
tion of alleged sham petitioning by medical device manufacturers).
32. 404 U.S. 508, 513-16 (1972), affg 432 F.2d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 1970) (describing
allegations that defendants conspired to deter plaintiffs from filing or pursuing applications
with the ICC and the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) by threatening to
oppose every such application regardless of merit).
33. See id.; Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d
1240,1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982) (describing allegations that defendants filed protests with the
ICC against each of plaintiff's tariff amendments solely for purpose of delay), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Transkentucky Transp. R.R. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 581 F. Supp.
759, 763 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (describing allegations that defendants instituted sham
proceedings before the ICC and other bodies to harass plaintiffs); Assigned Container Ship
Claims, Inc. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1420, 1421-24 (9th Cir.) (Federal
Maritime Administration), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986).
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have alleged that sham petitioning or other misconduct worthy of
antitrust scrutiny has occurred before the following agencies: the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 4 the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), 5 the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC), 6 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 7 the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),38 the old Civil
34. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 809 (2d Cir. 1983)
(describing allegations that defendant's opposition to the development of FCC certification
standards was improper), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); Mid-Texas Communications
Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1383-84 (5th Cir.) (describing
allegations that defendant's opposition to plaintiff's complaint before the FCC was merely
a delaying tactic), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1361 (D.D.C. 1981) (describing government's allegations that
defendants pressed groundless claims before the FCC in order to frustrate entry of
competitors); WIXT Television, Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1003, 1025-26
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) (describing allegations that defendant improperly opposed plaintiff's
application requesting FCC approval of a planned relocation of its transmission facility).
35. See City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1180-81 (8th Cir. 1982)
(describing allegations that defendant's rate filings before the FERC were improper), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d
976, 981-83 (7th Cir. 1980) (describing allegations that defendants' wholesale rate filings
before the FERC were used improperly to "price squeeze" the plaintiffs), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1096 (1981); Illinois ex reL Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826,
937-38 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (describing allegations that defendant improperly opposed plaintiff's
FERC requests seeking another source of natural gas and the modification of a tariff),
affd, 935 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992); Consolidated Gas
Co. v. City Gas Co., 665 F. Supp. 1493,1509-10 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (describing allegations that
defendant intervened before the FERC in order to delay consideration of plaintiff's
application for natural gas), affd, 880 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 499 U.S.
915 (1991); Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 517 F. Supp. 218,219-20 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (describing allegations that defendant's application to the FERC for an auxiliary
service provision was improper); see also Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (D. Haw. 1978) (involving proceedings before the Federal
Energy Administration).
36. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1390
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), affjd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Greenwood Utils. Comm'n
v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1498-99 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving proceedings
before the Department of Energy's Southeastern Power Administration).
37. See Israel v. Baxter Lab., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing
allegations that incumbent firm made misrepresentations to and conspired with FDA
officials to prevent agency approval of plaintiff's competing drug); Mylan Lab., Inc. v.
Akzo, N.V., 770 F. Supp. 1053,1064 (D. Md. 1991) (describing allegations that defendants
bribed FDA officials to approve their generic drugs in advance of plaintiff's drug); F-D-C
REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Nov. 28, 1994, at T&G-12 (describing recent antitrust
lawsuit alleging that pioneer drug manufacturer manipulated FDA regulations to block
approval of generic competitor); see also supra notes 1-2 (describing FTC investigations).
38. See Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1195 (8th Cir. 1982)
(describing allegations that three milk marketing cooperatives improperly attempted to
block plaintiff's effort to become "qualified" by USDA on various federal market orders),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390
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Aeronautics Board (CAB), 39 the United States Department of
Commerce,' and the Federal Reserve Board.4'
Competitors also have challenged the petitioning activities of
incumbent firms before various state and local agencies, including
public utility commissions,4 2 hospital construction review boards,43
licensing and franchising authorities,4' building permit agencies,4'
F. Supp. 696, 699 (D. Colo. 1975) (describing allegations that defendant bribed USDA
officials).
39. See, e.g., Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1064, 1065
(D. Haw. 1972) (describing allegation that competitor opposed plaintiff's application before
the CAB with predatory intent), affd, 489 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 427 U.S.
913 (1974); Beltz Travel Serv., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
75,223 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (describing allegations of anticompetitive efforts to influence the
CAB). The CAB was dissolved in 1978 and its functions transferred to the Department
of Transportation (DOT). See Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40(a), 92
Stat. 1744 (1978).
40. See Music Ctr. S.N.C. Di Luciano Pisoni & C. v. Prestini Musical Instruments
Corp., 874 F. Supp. 543, 547-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing allegations that antidumping
petitions filed with agency by American company inappropriately sought to exclude Italian
manufacturer from United States market); see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474
F. Supp. 168, 174 (D. Del. 1979) (describing allegations that defendant submitted false
information to the Customs Service respecting the prices of golf carts built in Canada in
the hope that dumping duties then would be assessed against plaintiff).
41. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 508 F. Supp.
91, 93 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (describing allegation that defendant improperly challenged
plaintiff's application to the Board to transfer data processing activities to a non-banking
subsidiary).
42. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1156-
58 (7th Cir.) (describing allegations that defendant improperly filed interconnection tariffs
with state utility commissions throughout the country to delay plaintiffs entry into
telecommunications market), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th Cir. 1971) (Texas
Railroad Commission), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Transkentucky Transp. R.R. v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 581 F. Supp. 759, 763 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (Kentucky Railroad Commis-
sion); Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 517 F. Supp. 218, 219-20 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission).
43. See Potters Medical Ctr. v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1986);
St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 955 (11th Cir. 1986);
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678,683 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 890, 904 (1983); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 650 F. Supp. 1325,
1340-41 (E.D. Mich. 1986), affd, 849 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
942 (1988). For background on hospital construction reviews, see Frances H. Miller,
Antitrust and Certificate of Need: Health Systems Agencies, the Planning Ac4 and
Regulatory Capture, 68 GEO. L.J. 873 (1980); James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return
of Certificate of Need Regulation of Health Facilities to State Control, 19 IND. L. REV. 1025
(1986).
44. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-10 &
n.15 (1978) (describing allegations that procedure allowing automobile dealers to protest
the establishment of new franchises violated federal antitrust law); Central Telecom-
munications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 718-19 (8th Cir. 1986) (describing
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and zoning boards.4 6 In many of these cases, of course, the courts
rejected the plaintiffs' allegations as either factually unsupported or
insufficient to entitle them to any relief under the antitrust laws.
A few of these cases merit somewhat more detailed description
to illustrate the variety of agency procedural devices available if
incumbent firms wish to delay or prevent market entry by corn-
allegations that incumbent firm subverted bidding process for cable television franchise),
cert denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84,85
(9th Cir. 1982) (describing allegations that incumbents lobbied airport officials to lease
space to car rental companies on restrictive conditions), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983);
Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288,297 (8th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff's
allegations included claim that defendants induced the city's aviation department to refuse
to file an application with FAA for approval of a master security plan); Kurek v. Pleasure
Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 585-86 (7th Cir. 1977) (describing allegations that
defendant conspired with Park District officials in awarding concessions to operate pro
shops at local golf courses), vacated, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978);
Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1975)
(describing allegations that defendant conspired with city council to ensure award of cable
television franchise and deny plaintiffs request); United States v. Central State Bank, 564
F. Supp. 1478, 1482 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (describing allegation that defendant improperly
filed objection with state banking authority against plaintiff s application to open a new
branch).
45. See Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland, 901 F.2d 266, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1990)
(describing allegations that developers conspired with city officials in seeking necessary
permits for proposed new shopping mall that would compete with plaintiff's existing mall);
Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing
allegations that city, as owner of commercial property that would compete with plaintiff's
proposed new shopping center, improperly petitioned state environmental commission and
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to apply their permitting and other requirements);
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1976) (describing allegations that defendants
improperly opposed plaintiffs applications for building permits to construct new res-
taurants), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Home
Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19, 22-23 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (describing allegations that
defendants improperly opposed plaintiff's applications to regional building code organiza-
tions and the Federal Housing Administration for approval of its ductless bathroom fans).
46. See Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 156 (9th Cir. 1993)
(describing allegations that defendant pressed improper administrative and judicial appeals
of permits granted to competing shopping center), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 77 (1994);
Oberndorf v. City of Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1436-37 (10th Cir.) (describing antitrust
challenge to activities associated with urban renewal project), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845
(1990); Video Int'l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d
1075, 1082-83 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing allegations that defendant improperly petitioned
city officials to interpret zoning code as preventing cables from crossing private property
lines), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1047 (1989); Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d
891, 892-95 (2d Cir. 1981) (describing allegations that defendants conspired to prevent
plaintiff from opening a competing shopping center by organizing protracted opposition
before the local zoning commission); WIXT Television, Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 506 F.
Supp. 1003, 1026-29 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (describing allegations that defendants improperly
opposed plaintiff's application for a zoning variance).
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petitors. In City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co.,47 for
example, ten municipalities sued a utility for alleged violations of
federal antitrust law. Plaintiffs in that case claimed that the utility
had engaged in unlawful "price squeezing" by charging the munici-
palities a wholesale rate for electricity that exceeded the utility's retail
rate, allegedly in an effort to prevent the plaintiffs themselves from
continuing to compete for retail customers.' Federal law prohibits
such rate discrimination.49 However, the FERC generally reviews
rate filings only after the fact-rates filed by a utility do not require
any preapproval, though the Agency may subsequently review them
and order a refund if it finds that the rates are unlawful.50
Evidently, in City of Mishawaka, the utility had filed a series of
excessive wholesale rates with the FERC, managing to fie a new and
even higher rate to supersede an existing rate that the Commission
was about to find unjust and unreasonable.5' The FERC ordered a
number of refunds to the municipalities over the years, but these
proceedings cost the municipalities time and money, and the
Commission's refund orders had no effect on subsequent rate
filings.52 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit characterized these "maneuverings" as "an abuse of
the administrative process."53
In contrast to the relatively passive role assigned the FERC in
reviewing the wholesale rate filings at issue in City of Mishawaka, the
Commission is directly involved when asked to approve an allocation
request under the Natural Gas Act.54 In one dispute that resulted
in antitrust litigation, the Consolidated Gas Company of Florida
47. 465 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affd in part, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
48. Id. at 1324.
49. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (1988); Federal Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S.
271, 277-79 (1976); see also Keith A. Rowley, Note, Immunity from Regulatory Price
Squeeze Claims: From Keogh, Parker, and Noerr to Town of Concord and Beyond, 70
TEX. L. REV. 399, 405-12 (1991) (explaining price squeeze technique).
50. See 18 C.F.R. § 35 (1995).
51. City of Mishawaka, 465 F. Supp. at 1328. Defendants asserted that they also had
sought increases in their retail rates but were unable to put them into effect without first
securing approval from the Public Service Commissions of Indiana and Michigan. Id. at
1337-38.
52. Id. at 1328-29.
53. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 982-83 (7th Cir.
1980). The court found that "[t]he dual regulatory process is being taken undue advantage
of by the utility, thwarting the intended balance of federal and state regulation." Id. at
983.
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1988); 18 C.F.R. § 156 (1995).
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applied for such an allocation so that it could resell natural gas to its
existing customers.55 One month later, City Gas Company of Florida
filed a petition requesting leave to intervene and object to Con-
solidated's submission on a number of different grounds. The FERC
eventually granted Consolidated's allocation request, rejecting all but
one of the objections raised by City Gas.56 The court noted,
however, that City Gas's intervention had prevented Consolidated
from receiving a temporary certificate for natural gas within ninety
days of filing its allocation request and had delayed final agency
action by more than one year, delays which allowed City Gas to begin
providing service to most of Consolidated's customers."
In City of Mishawaka, the electric utility allegedly had manipu-
lated the FERC's rate filing procedures in a manner that allowed it
to maintain clearly unlawful wholesale rates, subject only to later
refunds. By contrast, incumbent firms in other industries may succeed
in deterring competitors by objecting to apparently lawful rate filings.
For instance, new rates published by freight forwarders (moving
companies) automatically take effect after thirty days unless someone
lodges a protest with the ICC, in which case the rate may be
suspended pending agency review.58 In one case, a freight forwarder
published successively lower tariffs, as recommended by the ICC, in
an effort to compete with the rates of unregulated shipper as-
sociations.59 One association protested every one of these tariff
amendments, without regard to the merits; although the freight
forwarder prevailed before the ICC in each proceeding, it claimed
that the shippers who were its customers would not use a rate which
was under investigation.' ° The freight forwarder alleged that the
association's intent "was not to induce favorable administrative action
from the ICC, but rather to saddle [it] with such onerous regulatory
55. See Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 665 F. Supp. 1493, 1509 (S.D. Fla.
1987), aff d, 880 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 499 U.S. 915 (1991).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1509-10. According to the court, "two facts are clear: first, Consolidated
was severely damaged by the delay which occurred as a direct result of City Gas'
intervention; and, second, City Gas' reason for opposing Consolidated's application was
to protect its own domain." Id. at 1542.
58. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10,725, 10,762(c)(3) (1988); 49 C.F.R. § 1312 (1995).
59. See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1246 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
60. Id. at 1246-47, 1253. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants had submitted
fraudulent information to the ICC in connection with their rate protests. Id. at 1259-60.
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and administrative burdens that it would be forced to withdraw the
rates.",
61
The American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), a
frequent target of antitrust litigation, has been challenged on a
number of occasions for its conduct before the FCC and state
regulatory agencies. In one case, government prosecutors alleged that
AT&T had pressed several false and groundless claims in opposition
to applications filed with the FCC in order to frustrate market entry
by competitors. 62 Internal documents revealed that AT&T's opposi-
tion to one particular application was baseless and sought only to
delay FCC consideration of this threat to the company's monopoly in
network transmission.6' In fact, although the applicant ultimately
prevailed before the Commission, it was forced to declare bankruptcy,
in part because it had been "financially weakened by the delay" in
administrative review.'
In another case, a private plaintiff successfully alleged that
AT&T's filing of certain interface tariffs had been intended solely to
delay competition.65 As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit explained in affirming judgment for the plaintiff:
AT&T had no realistic hope that the FCC would approve
the interface device; its own people thought that the device
was a redundant "artificial barrier" to competition. It never-
theless consciously pursued a policy of delaying the time
when the FCC would strike down the PCA requirement. It
implemented this policy by making baseless claims relative
to potential harms to the network while opposing cer-
tification standards in every way possible.66
In a third reported case, MCI Communications alleged that AT&T
had filed tariffs for interconnection charges with forty-nine state
commissions, knowing that these agencies lacked jurisdiction over
61. Id. at 1254.
62. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1361, 1363
(D.D.C. 1981).
63. Id. at 1364.
64. Id. at 1364 n.116.
65. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 810-11 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
66. Id. at 811; see also Jack Faucett Assocs. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 118,
123-24 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (describing efforts by a different company to collaterally estop
AT&T on issues decided in Litton); Mid-Texas Communications v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1383-84 (5th Cir.) (describing allegations that defendant's opposition
to plaintiff's complaint before the FCC was merely a delaying tactic), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980).
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long distance communications but hoping that this tactic would delay
MCI's market entry by forcing the company first to resolve the issue
with each state commission and then with the FCC.'
C. Estimating the Prevalence of Sham Petitioning
Thus, plaintiffs in antitrust cases have alleged sham petitioning in
a wide variety of administrative contexts.' These cases provide only
a limited sense for the variety of procedural mechanisms that
incumbent firms may use to deter competition, and they can offer no
real insight into the actual prevalence of such behavior. On occasion,
agencies candidly acknowledge that a problem may exist.69 An
informal survey conducted by the author uncovered a range of
opinions about the prevalence of sham petitioning."° Although this
survey lacks any statistical value and can serve only as a very rough
indicator of the views of persons closely associated with the ad-
ministrative process, the results suggest, consistent with the record of
antitrust litigation described above, that administrative licensing
67. See MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1155-57 &
n.114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
68. See Milton Handler & Richard A. De Sevo, The Noerr Doctrine and Its Sham
Exception, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984). In fact, these authors found that "[trhe
largest number of suits raising [these] issues [have] concerned the petitioning of
administrative bodies." Id. at 20. Although no systematic effort has been made to
determine whether this trend has continued over the last decade, questions concerning the
proper application of the sham exception to proceedings before federal and state agencies
continue to arise with some frequency even though one might expect the number to
decrease as the futility of bringing these antitrust claims becomes more apparent to
litigants.
69. See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240,1262
n.34 (9th Cir. 1982) (describing ICC amicus brief urging the court to impose treble
damages against defendant in private antitrust litigation for alleged sham petitioning before
the agency), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); 60 Fed. Reg. 32,099, 32,100 (1995) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1301) (noting that, although it was aware of only a couple of
specific past instances, DEA was concerned about incumbents' use of regulatory hearings
to deter or delay market entry by competitors).
70. The author sent a short questionnaire to the general counsels of several federal
agencies and to a number of private attorneys in Washington, D.C., who once served in
and continue to practice before many of these same agencies. Twenty-two questionnaires
were returned (some of which requested confidential treatment), and copies are on file
with the author. Roughly half of the thirteen responses received from agency officials
indicated that sham petitioning occurs "rarely" or "never," and that the participation by
parties with economic interests delayed the agency's resolution of a pending matter only
"insignificantly." The remaining responses suggested that sham petitioning occurs at least
"occasionally" and may "moderately" increase delays. Of the nine responses received
from the private attorneys, half indicated that sham petitioning occurs at least "occasiona-
lly," and all but one felt that participation by third parties increased agency delays
"moderately" or "substantially."
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procedures may be more susceptible to anticompetitive abuse than
other types of agency proceedings.
Sham petitioning in the regulatory arena is not an unexpected
phenomenon. Many commentators have recognized the strategic
opportunities available to incumbent firms.7' As one scholar recently
observed: "Entering a market nowadays can require approvals from
a myriad of licensing boards, zoning commissions, and environmental
regulators. A firm that is repeatedly opposed in such proceedings
without regard to the legal merits can have its entry to the market
delayed for a long time."72 In its 1988 enforcement guidelines, the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice noted that the
"use of governmental processes to disadvantage a competitor and thus
to increase market power is in general a more plausible anticompeti-
tive strategy than is pricing below cost because a firm may be able to
trigger significant litigation costs and other administrative burdens at
little cost to itself."'73 Indeed, such opportunities for deterring
market entry may have been part of the political bargain struck
71. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 364 (1978) ("Predation through the misuse of governmental processes appears
to be a common but little-noticed phenomenon."); BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD
BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 2-5 (1978) (identifying opportunities for strategic use of the administrative
process); Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFF. L. REV.
39, 39 (1980) (noting that companies may intervene in administrative proceedings to "tie
up smaller businesses in uncertain and expensive proceedings, thereby increasing the cost
of doing business and preventing or delaying new entries into a particular market"); Ralph
Winter, The Use of Adjudicative Processes to Injure Competitors, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 278
(FTC Law & Econ. Conf., Mar. 1984) (noting that regulatory requirements are "subject
to strategic manipulation," and that often "the very pendency of ongoing administrative
or judicial proceedings, whether in licensing, environmental safeguards, public health,
building safety, zoning, or whatever, will halt the development of a new business").
72. Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L. REV.
1177, 1229 (1992); see also James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First
Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 69 (1985) ("Manipulating
governmental processes to secure advantages over existing and potential rivals can be an
attractive competitive strategy. A predator's conduct can be far more potent, and its
impact more permanent, when bolstered by the powers of government."); Richard A.
Manso, Comment, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants: Abuse of the Intervention Right, 21
U.S.F. L. REV. 121, 122 (1986) (noting that "non-meritorious allegations result in
unnecessary delays" in nuclear power plant licensing proceedings).
73. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations § 3.2,4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,109.10, at 20,596 (Dep't of Justice, Nov. 10, 1988); see also Hurwitz,
supra note 72, at 71-73 (identifying various possible asymmetries in the costs of bringing
and defending against actions before government agencies).
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between lawmakers and regulated entities,74 a hypothesis drawn from
the more general notion that agencies may become "captured" by the
very firms that they were established to regulate.'
It is also profoundly difficult to distinguish legitimate petitioning
from arguably improper use of administrative processes. As discussed
at length in the next Part, courts have struggled in antitrust cases to
define "sham" petitioning, but that effort has produced, at best, only
a partial and largely unsatisfying definition.76 Although the sham
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine-which is the subject of
the next Part-provides a useful starting point for resolving this
definitional quandary, the effort to delineate a category of abusive
conduct must await a richer description of the competing interests and
policies potentially affected by such an undertaking.
H. ANTITRUST LAW AND SHAM PETITIONING
Although plaintiffs' allegations in antitrust litigation provide some
sense for the possible abuses of the regulatory process, one must
remember that the federal antitrust laws were not designed as a
74. See, e.g., Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations § 3.2,
supra note 73 ("Indeed, many governmental processes are designed precisely to allow firms
to attempt to exclude existing or potential competitors ... ."); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Petitioning for Protection from Competition: A Comment, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF REGULATION, supra note 71, at 93, 98 ("The incumbents in an industry may have
scored a political victory, the essence of which was the creation of a cumbersome ad-
ministrative process that could be invoked to retard entry or price reductions by rivals.").
75. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1885-88 (1995);
Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:
A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 913-14 (1994); Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,1684-
87 (1975); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 713, 723-26 (1986); cf. Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications
Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 190-91 (1978)
("Though it cannot always explain how the agency will choose among competing industry
interests, the [capture] theory does suggest how the agency will choose between industry
and nonindustry interests or between regulated and unregulated interests."). Butsee PAUL
J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 177 (1981)
(finding no empirical support for this theory).
76. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113
S. Ct. 1920, 1925 (1993) ("The courts of appeals have defined 'sham' in inconsistent and
contradictory ways."); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,
507 n.10 (1988) (criticizing one court's approach to the question as "render[ing] 'sham' no
more than a label courts could apply to activity they deem unworthy of antitrust immunity
(probably based on unarticulated consideration of the nature and context of the activity)");
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (conceding
that this "may be a difficult line to discern and draw").
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response to this problem. On the contrary, as will be recounted in
this Part, the Supreme Court initially recognized a far-reaching
immunity from antitrust scrutiny for petitions to the government,
which it only later qualified by a limited exception for what it called
sham petitioning. Rather than designing procedures to combat any
threats of anticompetitive manipulation arising from this judicial
recognition of petitioning immunity, federal agencies actually
increased the opportunities for interference by third parties.17 In
casting around for a substitute for administrative reforms, courts and
lawyers seized upon the sham exception as a mechanism for using the
antitrust laws to monitor and potentially control abuses of agency
procedures. Thus, the existing reliance on antitrust laws to protect
the integrity of the regulatory process cannot be ascribed to any
conscious choice of the Sherman Act as the most effective or
desirable mechanism for policing participants; it just happened that
little else was available.
Because sham petitioning has been a subject addressed almost
exclusively from an antitrust perspective, it is first necessary to sketch
out the basic outlines of petitioning immunity and the sham excep-
tion.7" The term "petition" in this context broadly refers to any
formal or informal request directed to a government official or entity,
ranging from lobbying legislators to filing claims before a court. After
introducing the Supreme Court's foundational decisions in the area,
this Part describes some of the difficulties encountered by the lower
courts in applying the sham exception. The focus here will be on
those aspects of the doctrine that are most relevant in guarding
against potential abuses of the regulatory process.
After reviewing the Court's most recent guidance on these ques-
tions, this Part identifies the shortcomings that arise if one attempts
to rely solely on the antitrust laws to police sham petitioning before
77. See infra notes 255-72 and accompanying text.
78. This Article makes no pretense of attempting to join in the debate over these
issues; instead, it hopes to move beyond that debate, at least as it relates to sham
petitioning in the administrative context. For a much more detailed treatment of the
antitrust issues, see PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 203.1 (Supp. 1994);
Balmer, supra note 71; Elhauge, supra note 72; Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for
Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977); Handler & De Sevo, supra note 68; Earl W.
Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust Exemptions for Private Requests for Governmental
Action: A Critical Analysis of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549
(1984); Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern
Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (1990).
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administrative agencies. A number of commentators have suggested
valuable reforms in antitrust law, but an approach that focuses instead
on directly limiting opportunities for abuse of agency procedures will
better protect the integrity of the regulatory process, and may also
advance competition policy more effectively, than would ever be
possible by using the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity.
A. Origins of Petitioning Immunity and the Sham Exception
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,79 the United States Supreme Court held that lobbying activities
would not subject a person or group of persons to antitrust liability."
The case involved a deceptive political campaign waged as part of an
economic feud between the railroad and trucking industries for
control of the interstate market for heavy freight hauling. In their
lawsuit, representatives of the trucking industry alleged that the
railroads' publicity campaign opposing state legislation favorable to
truckers violated the Sherman Act because the sole purpose of the
campaign was to hamper the trucking industry's ability to compete.8'
The Supreme Court decided in Noerr that the Sherman Act did
not apply to prohibit activities comprising the "mere solicitation of
governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of
laws,"' even if those activities were fraudulent or deceptive.83 The
Court feared that an expansive construction of the antitrust statute
would impinge upon the First Amendment right to petition and
impair the government's ability to function effectively by denying it
an important source of information:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in
government of their desires with respect to the passage or
enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend
79. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
80. See id. at 144-45.
81. See id. at 129-30. The Court characterized the dispute as arising from:
a "no-holds-barred fight" between two industries both of which are seeking
control of a profitable source of income. Inherent in such fights, which are
commonplace in the halls of legislative bodies, is the possibility, and in many
instances even the probability, that one group or the other will get hurt by the
arguments that are made.
Id. at 144 (footnotes omitted).
82. Id. at 138.
83. See id. at 140-42 (describing a so-called "third-party technique" used in the
publicity campaigns as deceptive but declining to find that this had any relevance to the
antitrust inquiry). The deception of the public and public officials, "reprehensible as it is,
can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned." Id. at 145.
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upon their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor
illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that
they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a
disadvantage to their competitors.' 4
Although it therefore decided that anticompetitive intent was
irrelevant, the Court suggested that "[t]here may be situations in
which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing
governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relation-
ships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would
be justified."' 5  The Noerr Court did not provide any further
elaboration of this suggested "sham" exception to its newly recognized
antitrust immunity for petitioning.
Four years later, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,6 the
Court made it clear that efforts directed at executive officials or
agencies were immune from antitrust scrutiny in the same way that
the publicity campaign directed to the legislature was protected in
Noerr. In Pennington, an industry union and several large coal mining
firms allegedly had urged the Secretary of Labor to establish
minimum wage levels that would have the effect of squeezing out
smaller firms that sold coal on the spot market. 7 The Court held
such conduct immune: "Joint efforts to influence public officials do
not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate
competition.""8
In the last decision of the original trilogy, California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,89 the Court clarified several
aspects of the Noerr and Pennington decisions. First, it held that the
84. Id. at 139. "Indeed, it is quite probably people with just such a hope of personal
advantage who provide much of the information upon which governments must act." Id.
Thus, injuries to competitors that result from otherwise legitimate lobbying efforts would
not be cognizable under the Sherman Act. "It seems inevitable, whenever an attempt is
made to influence legislation by a campaign of publicity, that an incidental effect of that
campaign may be the infliction of some direct injury upon the interests of the party against
whom the campaign is directed." Id. at 143 (adding that "it is equally inevitable that those
conducting the campaign would be aware of, and possibly even pleased by, the prospect
of such injury").
85. Id. at 144. The Court hastened to add that "[n]o one denies that the railroads
were making a genuine [and what proved to be a "highly successful"] effort to influence
legislation and law enforcement practices." Id.
86. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
87. Id. at 660.
88. Id. at 670. The Court also noted that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a
concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose." Id.
89. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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immunity was founded on the constitutional right to petition the
government for redress of grievances." Second, the Court held that
this immunity extended to adjudicative proceedings before agencies
and courts.9 Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, it
gave effect to the dictum in Noerr concerning sham petitioning and
suggested that this exception should have an even broader application
outside of the legislative context: "Misrepresentations, condoned in
the political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory
process.
92
The plaintiffs in California Motor Transport alleged that a group
of trucking companies had opposed, without regard to the merits,
every one of their license applications to state regulatory agencies.
93
The Supreme Court held that such conduct would make the Noerr-
Pennington defense inapplicable,94 explaining that "a pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to
conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been
abused .. . , effectively barring respondents from access to the
agencies and courts."9' The Court conceded that incumbent firms
enjoyed a right to petition the government to oppose applications
filed by competitors, but it emphasized that this right would not
necessarily immunize them from antitrust liability.96
90. Id. at 510-11. In Noerr, the Court had rested its decision on an interpretation of
the Sherman Act that was informed only partially by First Amendment concerns. Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 132 n.6, 137-38 (1961); see
also Fischel, supra note 78, at 84 (explaining ambiguity about the constitutional basis of
the holding in Noerr).
91. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510 ("Certainly the right to petition extends
to all departments of the Government."). The Court concluded that
it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups
with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the
channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate
their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and
economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors.
Id. at 510-11.
92. Id. at 513. As the Court went on to explain, "unethical conduct in the setting of
the adjudicatory process often results in sanctions. Perjury of witnesses is one example."
Id. at 512. Two Justices thought that there should be no distinction "between trying to
influence executive and legislative bodies and trying to influence judicial bodies." Id. at
517 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).93. See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp., 432 F.2d 755, 762 (9th Cir.
1970) (detailing the plaintiffs' allegations), affd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
94. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 516.
95. Id. at 513.
96. See id. The Court found:
the following conclusions clear: (1) that any carrier has the right of access to
agencies and courts, within the limits, of course, of their prescribed procedures,
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Taken together, these decisions set the essential framework for
petitioning immunity and the sham exception. The year following its
decision in California Motor Transport, the Court suggested that
access-barring allegations may not be necessary to satisfy the sham
exception. In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,97 the
government alleged antitrust violations by a utility that had pressed
a number of ultimately unsuccessful lawsuits for the purpose of
preventing the sale of bonds necessary for the establishment of
competing municipal electric systems." The Supreme Court vacated
the decision below, remanding it for reconsideration in light of its
intervening decision in California Motor Transport, which the Court
characterized as holding that the sham exception may "apply to the
use of administrative or judicial processes where the purpose to
suppress competition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the
hallmark of insubstantial claims."99 On remand, the district court
found that "the repetitive use of litigation by Otter Tail was timed
and designed principally to prevent the establishment of municipal
electric systems and thereby to preserve defendant's monopoly,"'"
a decision summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.10'
B. Elaboration of the Sham Exception
After the Supreme Court's initial foray into petitioning immunity
and then the sham exception, lower courts assumed the difficult task
of applying and further shaping these doctrines. As one trial judge
observed, "[t]he distinction between the legitimate dissemination of
views and the manipulation of governmental processes for anticom-
petitive purpdses has been difficult to draw, and in various cases the
courts have come to conclusions that are not always easy to recon-
in order to defeat applications of its competitors for certificates as highway
carriers; and (2) that its purpose to eliminate an applicant as a competitor by
denying him free and meaningful access to the agencies and courts may be
implicit in that opposition.
Id. at 515.
97. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
98. Id. at 379 n.9 (quoting findings of the district court). The decision was also
notable for recognizing that Noerr-Pennington immunity and its sham exception would
apply to the conduct of a single defendant; the Court's prior three decisions had involved
allegations of concerted action.
99. Id. at 380.
100. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451, 451 (D. Minn. 1973).
101. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 901 (1974) (mem.).
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cile."' As this Article will explain later, these difficulties may be
unavoidable, suggesting that antitrust law is not the most appropriate
mechanism for protecting the integrity of the regulatory process.
In California Motor Transport, the Supreme Court had alluded
to a number of characteristics of sham petitioning-namely, claims
that were baseless and repetitive and that had the effect of barring a
competitor's access to a decisionmaking body-without specifying
which of these were minimally necessary before Noerr-Pennington
immunity would become inapplicable. Ultimately, application of the
sham exception turned on whether a petition to the government was
genuine. For most courts, the central inquiry became whether a
petition was baseless. Only a few courts have held that allegations of
either repetition or access-barring are prerequisites for invoking the
sham exception.
1. Access-Barring and Repetition
In one of the earliest cases to discuss the application of the sham
exception in the agency context, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of an antitrust complaint
which alleged that a group of restaurant and hotel employers had im-
properly opposed the plaintiffs' applications before the San Francisco
Board of Permit Appeals for building permits to construct new fast-
food restaurants.0 3 The court held that, in order to invoke the
sham exception, the plaintiffs would have to allege that the defen-
dants had engaged in specific, unprotected activities that barred the
plaintiffs' access to a governmental body."° The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Otter Tail
by noting that the utility's goal in that case-interfering with the sale
of municipal bonds-was accomplished by the mere act of filing the
102. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1362 (D.D.C. 1981);
see also Kintner & Bauer, supra note 78, at 570 (observing that lower court decisions
"have been neither uniform nor consistent in scope and analysis").
103. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076,1078-79 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
104. Id. at 1082 & n.4; see also Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d
484, 487-88 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding sham exception inapplicable absent evidence that
plaintiff had been barred from meaningful access to tribunal); Aurora Cable Com-
munications, Inc. v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 600,603 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (same);
WIXT Television, Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1003, 1032-33 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
("Plaintiff has not specifically pleaded or shown how it has been denied access to either
the FCC or the Onondaga Zoning Board.... [On the contrary,] plaintiff has been given
every opportunity to pursue its rights before the very same government agency it asserts
it has been denied access to.").
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various lawsuits. 5 The Otter Tail plaintiffs had not, however,
actually been barred from access to the courts; instead, they alleged
that the defendants had resorted to the courts solely for a purpose
that was collateral to any hope of success on the merits."°
In subsequent cases, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow its
earlier decision and agreed that access-barring was not a prerequisite
for use of the sham exception."3 In one of these decisions, for
example, the court applied the sham exception in a case in which a
shipper's association had automatically protested a series of tariff
reductions published by a competing freight forwarder, even though
the plaintiff apparently had enjoyed unfettered access to the ICC and
ultimately succeeded in prevailing on each of the challenged tariff
amendments."8 In other cases, courts have not hesitated to apply
the sham exception when plaintiffs were able to participate fully in
adjudicatory proceedings. 9 Thus, the access-barring language of
the Supreme Court's opinion in California Motor Transport has not
been viewed by most lower courts as stating a prerequisite for
invocation of the sham exception. Evidence that a defendant
inhibited a plaintiff's access to a decisionmaking body could, of
course, be quite persuasive as further support for allegations of sham
petitioning.
Similarly, with only a few exceptions, the lower courts have not
demanded that there be some repetition in the submission of baseless
claims before applying the sham exception. Although a pattern of
105. Franchise Realty, 542 F.2d at 1084. In dissent, Judge Browning took the majority
to task for attempting to distinguish Otter Tail in this fashion. Id. at 1087-88 (Browning,
J., dissenting).
106. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd
mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
107. See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240,
1257-59 & n.27 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.
v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 841 n.14 (9th Cir. 1980).
108. See Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1253-54. Courts in other jurisdictions have also
rejected the suggestion that the applicability of the sham exception turns on whether a
competitor is barred from access to agencies or courts. See, eg., Litton Sys., Inc. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 809 n.36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073
(1984); Transkentucky Transp. R.R. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 581 F. Supp. 759, 770 (E.D.
Ken. 1983). Evidence that petitioning denied a competitor meaningful access to
administrative processes still may be relevant. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of
Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890, 904 (1983).
109. See MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1158 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d
891,896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336,1364
& n.116 (D.D.C. 1981); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1359,
1385 (D. Haw. 1978).
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frivolous filings would strengthen the inference that the defendant's
conduct before an agency or court amounts to a sham,110 there is
general agreement among the courts that even a single petition may
lose Noerr-Pennington immunity if the defendant's request for govern-
ment action is not genuine and instead seeks to injure a com-
petitor."'
2. Objective Baselessness and Bad Faith
A petition is a sham if it is not genuine. This restatement of the
issue does little, however, to advance the search for a meaningful
definition. As the Court explained in California Motor Transport,
"opponents before agencies or courts often think poorly of the other's
tactics, motions, or defenses and may readily call them baseless.""
2
Thus, courts repeatedly have emphasized that application of the sham
exception does not turn on a petitioner's subjective intent."' As
one court put it, "[t]he intention to harm a competitor through ad-
ministrative or judicial proceedings is the precise matter shielded by
Noerr-Pennington immunity.""' 4 The test is primarily objective,
110. See, e.g., Landmarks Holding Corp., 664 F.2d at 896 (holding that Noerr-
Pennington immunity did not protect defendant's attempt to delay competitor's
construction of a shopping mall by orchestrating a series of administrative and judicial
actions to defeat a zoning variance); see also USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County
Bldg. & Const., 31 F.3d 800, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1994); Mid-Texas Communications v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1384 & n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). But cf. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1364
(D.D.C. 1981) (finding only one of several petitions before the FCC to be a sham).
111. See, e.g., MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1154-55 & n.114; Litton Systems, 700
F.2d at 811 (finding that, though not a pattern of repetitive claims, AT&T's "unitary,
ongoing claim" amounted to a sham); Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1254-57 & n.24
(recognizing split of authority on the question, but concluding that a single protest would
be sufficient to invoke the sham exception).
112. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
113. See, e.g., Video Int'l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858
F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that petitions to agencies "are exempt from
antitrust liability even though the parties seek ultimately to destroy their competitors
through these actions"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1047 (1989); Greenwood Utils. v. Mississippi
Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1499 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Nor does the possibility that the
companies had selfish or anticompetitive ends in mind when seeking to influence the
government deprive them of Noerr-Pennington protection."); City of Gainesville v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258,1265-66 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ("[A]nticompetitive motive
is the very matter protected under Noerr-Pennington."). But see Aloha Airlines, Inc. v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Haw. 1972) (holding allegation that
competitor opposed CAB application with predatory intent sufficient to invoke sham
exception), affd, 489 F.2d 203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 913 (1974).
114. Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826,937 (C.D.
Ill. 1990), affd, 935 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1991). The court held that the defendant's actions
in opposition to plaintiffs FERC requests represented "a genuine attempt to influence
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inquiring whether the petition is baseless or frivolous.1  The fact
that a petitioner intentionally causes delay in agency proceedings
generally is not, by itself, sufficient to trigger the sham exception."
6
Only in cases where delay appears to be the sole purpose underlying
petitions that have no reasonable chance of success on the merits
would Noerr-Pennington immunity be lost."7
Objective baselessness may be difficult to prove in the ad-
ministrative context, however, because agencies enjoy greater
policymaking discretion than do the courts. Indeed, where the
standards for approval of licenses and applications make reference to
undefined considerations of public interest, it may be impossible to
show that a competitor's objections were objectively baseless."8
governmental action, and were not undertaken just to harass competitors and deter others
... in spite of the fact that Panhandle also intended to harm competition." Id. at 939.
Thus, for instance, courts have held that a competitor's bona fide reports to law
enforcement officials are immune from antitrust attack. See King v. Idaho Funeral Serv.
Ass'n, 862 F.2d 744, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1988); Ottensmeyer v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 756 F.2d 986, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1985); Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1059-61 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1130 (1985).
115. See, eg., Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland, 901 F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 1990)
(recognizing immunity only for petitions "asserting colorable claims within the jurisdiction
of the particular tribunal"); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785,
810-11 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding ample evidence that AT&T's technical arguments to the
FCC were frivolous), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
116. See St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948,955 (11th Cir. 1986)
("In spite of the damaging effect, the defendants were within their rights to use every
available legal means to delay or forestall the [certificate of need] being issued and the
anticompetitive purpose did not make them illegal."); Litton Systems, 700 F.2d at 813
(approving jury instruction that creating " 'delays does not constitute willful exercise of
monopoly power as long as the petition.., is based on a good faith interest in influencing
the agency' "); Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Appellant's argument that some of these proceedings [to assess environmental impacts]
could only delay and not defeat the construction of the shopping mall do not render those
efforts frivolous."); Mid-Texas Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d
1372, 1385 n.10 (5th Cir.) (concurring with requested jury instruction that" 'petitioning an
administrative agency such as the FCC can result in certain delays because administrative
procedures are often time consuming ... [but] AT&T cannot be held responsible for
[such] delays' " (citation omitted)), cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
117. See, ag., Video Int'l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858
F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] party that 'petitions' the government by engaging in
administrative processes only to preclude or delay its competitor's access to those
processes may be liable for antitrust damages under the 'sham' exception."), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1047 (1989); Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891, 896-97 (2d Cir.
1981) ("The right to petition the courts for the redress of grievances does not protect
abuse of the judicial process through the institution and subsidization of baseless litigation
and delay of its final resolution, solely to harass and hinder a competitor.").
118. See Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1195 (8th Cir. 1982)
("[W]e cannot say that the attempts to block [plaintiff] from being deemed a qualified
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Even when agencies must apply more particularized criteria in
evaluating applications, such as having to consider the potential
residential effects of zoning modifications requested by a new
business, incumbent firms generally are free to press objections of this
sort even though their only real interest in the matter is the threat of
competition."9 For example, referring back to our drug approval
hypothetical, it would be difficult to say that Alpha's objections to
Medica's applications to the FDA and DEA, or its array of
maneuvers to block generic competition-Mfiling a citizen petition to
raise general bioequivalence concerns, objecting to particular ANDAs
and DEA registrations, and lobbying state drug formulary commit-
tees-are objectively baseless even if the company's ulterior purposes
were entirely transparent.
There may be situations when an incumbent firm's claims before
an agency clearly are indefensible as a matter of law, and courts have
applied the sham exception in the few cases in which this was
true.2° Similarly, a petition may be treated as a sham if its al-
legations lack any factual support (amounting to fraud), but simple
cooperative were not genuine attempts to influence official policymaking."), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 937 (1983); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The relatively
precise legal standards in light of which certain arguments may be characterized as
'frivolous' are simply absent from the rough and tumble of the political arena; almost any
position, including the self-interested plea of one competitor... may be urged before such
a political body."), cerL denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Rush-Hampton Indus. v. Home
Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19,24 (M.D. Fla. 1976) ("The fact that opposition is strongly
voiced in an administrative hearing carries in and of itself no implication of an intent to
interfere with the competitor's business relations, even if the opposition contains
misstatements of fact or incompletely researched or unjustified and argumentative
conclusions.").
119. See BORK, supra note 71, at 362 (elaborating further this hypothetical case and
suggesting that such conduct should constitute a violation of the antitrust laws); Hurwitz,
supra note 72, at 69 ("Aggressively self-serving petitions, objections, and arguments are
the norm, and the visible bounds of 'proper' conduct are faint at best."); cf. Easterbrook,
supra note 74, at 97-98 ("A statute requiring 'certificates of public interest, convenience,
and necessity' or other licenses as conditions of entry is more likely to be the handiwork
of trade groups seeking to slow down or interdict competition from new entrants than it
is to be a method of 'protecting the public'...."). Similarly, the "zone of interest"
requirement of standing doctrine has not prevented competitors from pressing the interests
of consumers in reviewing courts. See infra note 268.
120. See MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1156-57
(7th Cir.) (finding that, when it filed its tariffs, AT&T knew that state utility commissions
lacked jurisdiction over interstate rates), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); City of
Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that
utility knew that its wholesale rate filings violated the Federal Power Act), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1096 (1981).
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inaccuracies or exaggerations generally would not suffice.' Thus,
in lobbying state formulary committees, Alpha could reiterate the
bioequivalence concerns that it raised unsuccessfully with the FDA,
but it could not claim that the generic approvals were procured by
bribery of FDA officials if there was no basis for making such an
allegation. In general, the complete failure to prevail on the merits
may provide some evidence of baselessness.'22 Conversely, success
on the merits of the petition normally will demonstrate that the claim
was not baseless and ensure Noerr-Pennington imnunity.11
For the sham exception to apply, a petition must be brought
solely for the purpose of interfering with a potential competitor.
Evidence that a claim is baseless satisfies only the first prerequisite.
In fact, some courts have suggested that the sham exception would
apply only in those cases in which the defendant actually knew that
its claims had no chance of success but proceeded simply in the hopes
121. See Assigned Container Ship Claims, Inc. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 784
F.2d 1420, 1423-24 (9th Cir.) (holding that the shipper's factual assertions in separate
petitions to Federal Maritime Administration were not inconsistent with one another), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336,
1363-64 (D.D.C. 1981) (noting that a sham petition "must amount to a subversion of the
integrity of the process," for instance by intending "to mislead the [administrative] body
concerning central facts"); WIXT Television, Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1003,
1032 (N.D..N.Y. 1980); Rush-Hampton Indus. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19,
24 (M.D. Fla. 1976) ("At most, plaintiff has established that defendants might have been
negligent in researching the ductless fan's effectiveness.").
122. See, e.g., Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891, 896 (2d Cir. 1981);
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 841 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1980); see also
Transkentucky Transp. R.R. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 581 F. Supp. 759, 771 (E.D. Ken.
1983) (emphasizing that the "defendants were ultimately unsuccessful in each of the"
proceedings before the ICC, a state regulatory commission, and the courts).
123. See, e.g., Video Int'l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858
F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that the defendant succeeded in convincing city
officials to adopt an interpretation of the zoning code that it had advocated), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1047 (1989); Greenwood Utils. v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1500 (5th
Cir. 1985) ("[W]hen a defendant succeeds, as here, in persuading the government to adopt
his position, his petitioning conduct should not be considered sham activity."); Metro Cable
Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220, 232 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); Central Bank
v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 167 (E.D. Mo. 1976) ("[I]t does not appear that
defendants' intervention and subsequent appeals in the state agencies and courts were
baseless, since defendants prevailed at two stages of the appeals that followed denial of
the [bank] charter."), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). But
see In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1987) (success may not
foreclose application of sham exception), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988); Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 179 & n.19 (D. Del. 1979) (success on the
merits not dispositive if procured through misrepresentations).
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of harming a competitor. 24 This approach reintroduces difficult
problems of trying to divine subjective intent. Because the resolution
of questions such as these often depends on inferences drawn from
the petitioner's conduct, however, courts may hesitate when asked to
resolve claims of Noerr-Pennington immunity in advance of trial."z
3. Distinguishing Legislative and Adjudicative Action
One final set of noteworthy questions has arisen from litigation
about the sham exception. From the outset, the Supreme Court
suggested a sharp distinction between the political arena of the
legislature and the adjudicatory setting of judicial and administrative
proceedings, with the latter category benefitting from a more
expansive sham exception and a correspondingly lesser degree of
petitioning immunity" It is not, of course, simple to categorize
agency decisionmaking as primarily legislative or adjudicatory. 27
For instance, the various procedural devices available to Alpha Phar-
maceuticals arise in settings that may be characterized as primarily
legislative (e.g., the citizen petition regarding bioequivalence problems
with generics, and the lobbying of state formulary committees) or
adjudicative (e.g., objections raised during FDA product approval and
DEA licensing proceedings).
124. See, eg., Greenwood Utils., 751 F.2d at 1500 ("Only where evidence shows that the
defendant knew or should have known that the action he sought was improper would a
court be justified in labeling his petitions a 'sham' not entitled to Noerr-Pennington
protection."); MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1157 (7th
Cir.) (citing evidence that AT&T knew that its interconnection tariff filings before state
utility commissions were baseless), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1364 (D.D.C. 1981) (applying sham
exception to only one aspect of AT&T's conduct: "The Court can reasonably infer from
[internal documents] that AT&T's sole purpose in opposing the Datran application was
to preserve its monopoly and that it well knew that the positions it took before the FCC
were baseless.").
125. See, e.g., United States v. Central State Bank, 564 F. Supp. 1478,1482 (W.D. Mich.
1983); Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 517 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Pa.
1981). But cf. Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 650 F. Supp. 1325, 1342 (E.D.
Mich. 1986) ("[A]fter extensive discovery plaintiff has failed to come forward with any
evidence that would create a material issue of fact as to the bona fides of defendant's
actions" in asking HHS to reconsider its approval of plaintiff's application.), aff'd, 849 F.2d
262 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
126. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)
("Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the
adjudicatory process.").
127. See BORK, supra note 71, at 356 ("[T]here are many governmental bodies whose




Several lower courts have accepted the Supreme Court's view in
California Motor Transport that agency licensing decisions resemble
judicial rather than political processes." Indeed, under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA), licensing is treated as an ad-
judicative process. 2 9 Other courts, however, have recognized the
difficulty in trying to pigeonhole agency decisionmaking as either
legislative or adjudicative.'o In fact, even if agency proceedings are
characterized as adjudicative, there may be a question as to whether
particular submissions (such as tariff filings that initially may take
effect without any prior agency action) even deserve to be treated as
"petitions" entitled to any First Amendment protection.'
128. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hospital Corp., 795 F.2d 948, 955 (11th Cir. 1986)
("When a governmental agency such as SHPA is passing on specific certificate applications
it is acting judicially."); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220, 228
(7th Cir. 1975) ("When the city council exercises its authority to franchise or refrain from
franchising cable television systems, it still acts as a legislative body, since that is the only
way it is organized and equipped to act."); Mylan Lab., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F. Supp.
1053, 1063 n.11 (D. Md. 1991) (noting that immunity applies to "attempts to influence
agency action even where individualized decision-making (versus regulation of broader
application) is involved"); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D.
Del. 1979) ("[T]he action of the Treasury Department in assessing dumping duties against
an importer is no more 'political' than any adjudicatory (i.e., fact-finding) proceeding.");
Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1359, 1385 (D. Haw. 1978)
(noting that defendant's reports and applications to the Federal Energy Administration
"are subject to closer scrutiny because they occurred in an adjudicatory setting").
129. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(9) (1994); City otWest Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 643
(7th Cir. 1983).
130. See, e.g., Federal Prescription Serv. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d
253, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[W]here, as here, the activities complained of consist of
traditional attempts to induce regulatory action, it ill serves the policies underlying Noerr
to make the protection of the lobbying depend on the 'administrative' or 'legislative'
nature of the lobbied government agency." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928
(1982); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The absence of more definite
standards [governing the agency's exercise of discretion] suggests that the Board [of Permit
Appeals] is as much a political as an adjudicatory body."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940
(1977). The court in Federal Prescription Service noted that a well-established distinction
between legislative and administrative functions exists with respect to official immunity but
thought it "unnecessary and inappropriate to import that distinction into a Noerr analysis."
663 F.2d at 266-67 n.15. But see Franchise Realty, 542 F.2d at 1087 n.1 (Browning, J.,
dissenting) ("The complaint alleges that the Board's function is adjudicatory. The majority
suggests that it may in fact be legislative. The distinction is critical.").
131. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 998 F.2d 1129,1138 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim
that collective rate setting efforts qualified as protected petitioning), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1292 (1994); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1983)
("AT & T cannot cloak its actions in Noerr-Pennington immunity simply because it is
required, as a regulated monopoly, to disclose publicly its rates and operating
procedures."), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources,
Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1359,1385 (D. Haw. 1978) ("[I]t is at best questionable that the activities
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The courts have distinguished between legislative and ad-
judicatory decisionmaking because the standards of acceptable
conduct are said to vary substantially in the two arenas. In the
adjudicatory setting, it is argued, sham petitioning may be easier to
identify because it often will be associated with some fairly clear
violation of a rule of conduct. For instance, misrepresentations to an
agency or court are condemned as inappropriate and, therefore, not
entitled to immunity from antitrust scrutiny, whereas the norms of
permissible conduct in the legislative setting may be less clearly
defined.' As the Ninth Circuit explained:
There is an emphasis on debate in the political sphere, which
could accommodate false statements and reveal their falsity.
In the adjudicatory sphere, however, information supplied by
the parties is relied on as accurate for decision making and
dispute resolving. The supplying of fraudulent information
thus threatens the fair and impartial functioning of these
agencies and does not deserve immunity from the antitrust
laws.
133
Some conduct, such as bribery, is clearly not permissible in either
arena, and such corrupt practices are therefore beyond the protection
of Noerr-Pennington immunity."4
therein alleged [such as reports to the Federal Energy Administration] were directed
towards achieving a political result or affecting public policy."). But see Clipper Exxpress
v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Transphase Sys., Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 839 F.
Supp. 711, 716-17 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
132. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,513 (1972)
("Misrepresdntations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the
adjudicatory process."); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687
(4th Cir. 1982) ("[Mjisrepresentations made with intent to abuse the administrative
processes so as to deny [plaintiff] meaningful access to the [agency] would fall within the
sham exception."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890 (1983); Woods Exploration & Producing Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286,1298 (5th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1362 n.108
(D.D.C. 1981) (noting that "a distinction may be made on the basis of the type of
governmental body involved (legislative or administrative) and the function it exercises
(rule-making or adjudicative) when the issue is whether a deliberate misrepresentation is
protected"); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168,179 (D. Del. 1979); Oahu
Gas, 460 F. Supp. at 1385 n.49.
133. Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1261; see also Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct.
1754, 1757-61 (1995) (discussing the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988), a criminal
statute prohibiting false statements in matters before "any department or agency of the
United States," to different branches of the federal government).
134. See Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 722-
25 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Hospital Bldg. Co., 691 F.2d at 687;
see also Israel v. Baxter Lab., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("No actions which
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Various questions remained unresolved in these cases involving
alleged misrepresentations and other corrupt practices, such as
whether this sort of misconduct itself may represent a violation of the
antitrust laws if accompanied by some predatory intent. There may
be a countervailing concern with allowing, by application of the
antitrust laws against successful petitioning, a collateral attack on a
final decision rendered by another governmental body, especially
when that decisionmaker has not itself reopened the matter on
account of the alleged misconduct. 3 ' In whatever manner these
questions are resolved, it is important to keep in mind that the rules
and norms governing the conduct of participants before various
decisionmaking bodies may help determine whether a particular
petition should be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. As
argued in subsequent sections, agencies should take greater respon-
sibility for regulating the conduct of interested parties in the
proceedings before them.
C. Recent Supreme Court Guidance
Although lower courts struggled with these issues, the Supreme
Court remained largely silent with regard to Noerr-Penningtonimmunity and the sham exception for nearly fifteen years. Then,
beginning in 1988, the Court decided a series of cases addressing some
of these questions. In the first of the series, Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,16 the Court held that Noerr immunity
did not apply to a company's efforts to manipulate the standard-
setting process of a private association notwithstanding the fact that
these product standards were widely adopted by state and local
governments. 37 The Court summarized its earlier decisions on
petitioning immunity in the following terms:
impair the fair and impartial functioning of an administrative agency should be able to
hide behind the cloak of an antitrust exemption." (footnote omitted)). But cf. Bustop
Shelters, Inc. v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 995-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that sham exception did not apply even if defendants had improperly pressured
city officials); Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696, 704
(D. Colo. 1975) ("Though bribery and illegal campaign contributions may constitute abuses
of the administrative process, they do not, in the context alleged here, suggest an ulterior
purpose to harm competition." (footnote omitted)).
135. See Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 109.
136. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
137. See id. at 509-10. "Unlike the publicity campaign in Noerr, the activity at issue
here did not take place in the open political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of
decisionmaking, but within the confines of a private standard-setting process... [that can]
more aptly be characterized as commercial activity with a political impact." Id. at 506-07.
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A publicity campaign directed at the general public, seeking
legislation or executive action, enjoys antitrust immunity
even when the campaign employs unethical and deceptive
methods.... But in less political arenas, unethical and
deceptive practices can constitute abuses of administrative or
judicial processes that may result in antitrust violations....
Of course, in whatever forum, private action that is not
genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action
is a mere sham that cannot be deemed a valid effort to
influence government action.
138
The Court rejected the notion that the sham exception would apply
where a party genuinely seeks the governmental action requested in
a petition but does so through improper means.139 This discussion
of the sham exception in Allied Tube was mere dicta, however,
because the Court had held that Noerr-Pennington immunity would
not apply in the first place to conduct that did not directly or
indirectly seek to influence government action.' 4
In 1991, the Court squarely addressed questions concerning the
proper application of the sham exception.' The case arose from
a dispute between two billboard companies competing in Columbia,
South Carolina: Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (COA), which
controlled ninety-five per cent of the relevant market, and Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Omni), the new entrant.'42 Omni
138. Id. at 499-500 & n.4. Later in the opinion, the Court characterized Noerr as giving
"wide latitude [to] ethically dubious efforts to influence legislative action in the political
arena," but it added that this immunity would not necessarily extend to "misrepre-
sentations made under oath at a legislative committee hearing in the hopes of spurring
legislative action." Id. at 504.
139. Id. at 507 n.10 (noting that such use of the word "sham" distorts its meaning).
More importantly, the Ninth Circuit's approach renders "sham" no more than a
label courts could apply to activity they deem unworthy of antitrust immunity
(probably based on unarticulated consideration of the nature and context of the
activity), thus providing a certain superficial certainty but no real "intelligible
guidance" to courts or litigants.
Id. (citation omitted).
140. Indian Head had asked that its plastic conduit be recognized in the next edition
of the National Electrical Code, a proposal that was placed on the agenda for the 1980
meeting of the National Fire Protection Association. Id. at 496. Fearing competition from
Indian Head's new product, Allied Tube and others interested in the continued sales of
steel conduit recruited and paid for 230 persons to join and attend the annual meeting of
the Association for the sole purpose of voting against this proposal, and Indian Head's
proposal was rejected by the slimmest of margins (394 to 390). See id. at 496-97. The
Court decided that such behavior would not escape antitrust scrutiny, primarily because
the challenged conduct was not directed to government decisionmakers. Id. at 499-500.
141. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
142. Id. at 367-68.
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brought an antitrust suit alleging, inter alia, that CGA executives had
met with certain city officials to seek the enactment of zoning
ordinances that would severely restrict new billboard construction.'43
The city council eventually passed an ordinance that had the effect of
seriously limiting Omni's ability to compete against COA.'
The Supreme Court held that COA's lobbying enjoyed Noerr-
Pennington immunity, rejecting Omni's argument that the sham
exception should apply in this case:
The "sham" exception to Noerr encompasses situations in
which persons use the governmental process-as opposed to
the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon.
A classic example is the filing of frivolous objections to the
license application of a competitor, with no expectation of
achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose
expense and delay.4
Of course, a person filing frivolous objections to a competitor's
application for a license still would genuinely hope, even if the actual
chances of success were slim, that the agency would find some merit
to the objections and deny the application."' The Court decided
that the sham exception did not apply to the case before it:
Although COA indisputably set out to disrupt Omni's
business relationships, it sought to do so not through the
very process of lobbying, or of causing the city council to
consider zoning measures, but rather through the ultimate
product of that lobbying and consideration, viz., the zoning
ordinances.... [T]he purpose of delaying a competitor's
entry into the market does not render lobbying activity a
"sham" .... 14
143. Id. at 368-69. The Court added that other persons had urged a similar response
to the recent increase in the number of billboards. Id. at 368.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 380; see also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110
n.15 (1978) ("Dealers who press sham protests before the New Motor Vehicle Board for
the sole purpose of delaying the establishment of competing dealerships may be vulnerable
to suits under the federal antitrust laws."); City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d
1173,1181 (8th Cir. 1982) ("The Noerr-Pennington doctrine will not protect a utility which
manipulates the federal and state regulatory processes to achieve anti-competitive
results."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
146. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 811-12 (2d Cir.
1983) ("AT&T argues that it actually wanted the FCC to approve the interface device and
reject certification standards, but as Professor Areeda points out: '[t]o be sure, [a
competitor] would always be pleased to obtain a governmental decision against his
rival.' "), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
147. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 381 (quoting its dicta from Allied Tube). The Court
added that "California Motor Transport involved a context in which the conspirators'
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The Court conceded that genuine attempts to influence government
action could include "defensive strategies" by an applicant "seek[ing]
by procedural and other means to get his opponent ignored," but it
concluded that the Sherman Act was not the proper mechanism for
"[p]olicing the legitimate boundaries of such" conduct.'"
Most recently, in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,49 the Supreme Court provided
some further guidance for determining whether a petition is genuine.
Although it arose in the context of litigation, the Court's discussion
of the sham exception should apply equally to petitions brought
before agencies.Y The Court held that a lawsuit brought against a
competitor will lose Noerr-Pennington immunity only if it is "ob-
jectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits."'' Only if a lawsuit was
objectively baseless would one proceed to the second part of the test,
namely, the inquiry into the petitioner's subjective intent and possible
predatory motive. Although Columbia Pictures lost on summary
judgment, the Court found that the company had probable cause to
bring its copyright infringement action, making inquiries into its actual
motivations for asserting this claim irrelevant." The Court
participation in the governmental process was itself claimed to be a 'sham,' employed as
a means of imposing cost and delay," and that its holding in the earlier case was "limited
to that situation." Id. at 381-82.
148. Id. at 382 (noting that "there may be other remedies" if Omni was wrongfully
denied meaningful access to decisionmakers). The Court also rejected the "conspiracy"
exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity that had been suggested by a number of courts.
Id. at 382-83.
149. 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
150. See Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1993)
(applying two-part test to administrative and judicial appeals against building and zoning
permits granted to competitor), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 77 (1994); Clipper Exxpress v.
Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1258 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The
same dangers that the antitrust laws seek to prohibit flow from instituting sham
administrative proceedings as flow from instituting sham judicial proceedings."), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
151. Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928 ("If an objective litigant could
conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is
immunized . .. ."). The Court added that a successful "lawsuit is by definition a
reasonable effort at petitioning for redress and therefore not a sham." Id. at 1928 n.5.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, pointed out that "[lt might not be objectively
reasonable to bring a lawsuit just because some form of success on the merits-no matter
how insignificant-could be expected." Id. at 1932 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See generally Gary Myers, Antitrust and
First Amendment Implications of Professional Real Estate Investors, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1199 (1994) (analyzing the Court's decision).
152. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1929-31.
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declined, however, to decide "to what extent Noerr permits the
imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant's fraud or other mis-
representations.,
153
D. Shortcomings of the Sham Exception
Because of the First Amendment interests at stake, courts have
given the sham exception a narrow construction."M Petitions to the
government, therefore, are cloaked in a presumption that they have
been brought in good faith.55 Thus, successful invocation of the
sham exception is difficult because "[p]etitioners almost always
genuinely desire government action, and [they] seldom have no
possibility of getting it."'56 Although a number of commentators
have suggested better ways of accommodating the constitutional right
to petition without sacrificing the pro-competitive policies underlying
the antitrust laws,'57 even such a reformed sham exception may fail
153. Id. at 1929 n.6. This statement is somewhat difficult to understand given the
Court's discussion of fraud and misrepresentation in California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1972) ("There are many other forms of illegal
and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and
which may result in antitrust violations.").
154. See MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1155 (7th
Cir.) ("The lower courts have tended to read California Motor Transport narrowly so as
not to tread on the First Amendment freedoms underlying the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine."), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Mid-Texas Communications, Inc. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1384 (5th Cir.) ("In assessing the applicability of the 'sham
exception' to Bell's direct representations before the FCC, it is important to note that it
should be read narrowly in order to protect the first amendment right of access to
administrative proceedings."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
155. See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1294 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that the presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence of bad
faith), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985); see also Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694
F.2d 1358, 1371-72 (5th Cir. 1983); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d
386, 389 (9th Cir. 1983).
156. Elhauge, supra note 72, at 1215; see also Minda, supra note 78, at 911 n.13 ("In the
legislative and executive context... the sham exception has had little or no application
even though these arenas are where the danger of business predation is likely to be the
greatest.").
157. See, ag., BORK, supra note 71, at 355 (stating that, although citizens enjoy a
constitutional right to petition, "there is also the correlative need that government be able
to protect the integrity of its processes, that it be able to punish those who would abuse
them."); Fischel, supra note 78, at 100-04, 122 ("The virtue of the suggested approach is
that it affords full and certain protection to first amendment freedoms while preserving the
public policy favoring competition embodied in the antitrust laws wherever constitutionally
permissible."); Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 119-25 (proposing an immunity rule that is more
closely calibrated to balance the competing values at stake); Robert J. Kaler, The Sham
Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity: Its Potential for Minimizing
Anticompetitive Abuse of the Administrative Process, 12 U. TOL. L. REv. 63, 90-93 (1980)
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to promote the equally important goal of maintaining the integrity of
the regulatory process. This latter goal receives frequent mention in
judicial opinions and scholarly articles that discuss the sham excep-
tion," 8 but the expressions of concern seem little more than lip
service. An approach that focuses instead on curbing abuses of
agency procedures may also advance competition policy more
effectively than would ever be possible with the sham exception to
Noerr-Pennington immunity, at least in its current form.
Several shortcomings with the sham exception were suggested in
the previous overview of the case law. First, there is the difficulty
with an objective test of baselessness in the administrative context
where license applications may be judged by vague standards of public
necessity and convenience.5 9 Because it will often be difficult to
prove that submissions before an agency are completely devoid of
possible merit, conduct that may be motivated by a predatory intent
frequently will escape antitrust scrutiny." °  Second, even if a
petition appears to be frivolous under objective legal standards, the
sham exception may still not apply if the petitioner honestly hoped to
(suggesting a distinction between attempts to influence agencies with regard to their
policymaking and commerce-regulating functions); Minda, supra note 78, at 1027 (arguing
that courts "have mistakenly assumed that painful choices must be made in upholding
either of two seemingly contradictory values-democratic values associated with the
political freedom of citizens to petition government, and antitrust values protecting private
actors from restraints of trade").
158. See, eg., Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d
1240,1261 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The supplying of fraudulent information thus threatens the fair
and impartial functioning of these agencies and does not deserve immunity from the
antitrust laws."), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v.
American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253,263 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
928 (1982); BORK, supra note 71, at 364 ("In this area, antitrust can not only perform a
valuable service to consumers but, as a by-product, can also contribute to the integrity and
efficiency of administrative and judicial processes.").
159. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. A number of agencies use such
amorphous tests. See, eg., 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988) (listing the FCC licensing standard
that refers to "public convenience, interest, or necessity"); Carstens v. NRC, 742 F.2d 1546,
1551 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (deferring to agency's substantive licensing judgment), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1136 (1985); Refrigerated Transp. Co. v. ICC, 709 F.2d 1430, 1432 (11th Cir.
1983) (same); 14 C.F.R. § 302.1704 (1995) (DOT certificates for scheduled airlines); 49
C.F.R. § 1150.4 (1994) (ICC certificates for railroads).
160. See Easterbrook, supra note 74, at 100 ("Non-colorable claims impose no loss on
business rivals, because they may be disposed of by court or agency quickly. The only
claims we need to worry about are the ones with just enough merit to linger and impose
loss on one's rivals." (footnote omitted)); cf. Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d
155, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1993) ("While not ultimately successful or of overwhelming strength,
the suit [arising from building and zoning permits granted to a competitor] was not so
objectively baseless that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the
merits."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 77 (1994).
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persuade agency officials. 6' Only in those rare instances where
other conduct or incriminating documents inescapably point to bad
faith and predatory intent will the sham exception come into play.'62
1. The Hunt for Doctrinal Reforms
A number of commentators have recognized these and other
limitations to reliance on the sham exception as a means of addressing
abuses of the regulatory process, yet they have lost little apparent
enthusiasm for the potential utility of the antitrust laws in this
area."6 A properly reconfigured sham exception, they contend, will
suffice to prevent the anticompetitive manipulation of agency
procedures.
Under one proposed revision, a series of "screens" would be used
to dispose of the bulk of private antitrust cases that do not pose a
true conflict between the values underlying the First Amendment and
the Sherman Act.' 6 First, a court would evaluate the pleadings to
confirm that a colorable antitrust offense has been alleged before
161. Indeed, "unsuccessful efforts in one governmental context may stimulate favorable
responses in other contexts," as when the hopeless pursuit of relief in agency proceedings
may represent a political statement designed to prompt legislative reforms. Hurwitz, supra
note 72, at 98 & n.148. "Civil rights, abortion, and environmental law are three areas in
which unsuccessful (and arguably meritless) legal challenges apparently have stimulated
legislative change." Id. at 99 n.148.
162. See supra note 124; cf. Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171,
1176-77 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that "sham" refers to the misuse or corruption of the
governmental process and not merely the filing of a lawsuit without probable cause and
with anticompetitive intent); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466,472
(7th Cir. 1982) (inquiring into the cost-justifications of litigation against a competitor), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983). The Supreme Court recently criticized this aspect of the
decision in Grip-Pak. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1925 n.3 & 1931 (1993).
163. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 71, at 348-49 ("The antitrust laws can make a major
contribution both to free competition and to the integrity of administrative and judicial
processes by catching up with this means of monopolization."); Elhauge, supra note 72, at
1250 (offering a "functional process perspective" to explain antitrust immunity for
petitioning); Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 119-26 (suggesting a multi-layered approach for
evaluating claims of petitioning immunity); Kaler, supra note 157, at 99 (concluding that
antitrust law's "potential for minimizing this abuse [of the regulatory process] should be
fully recognized in the federal courts through an expansion and clarification of its scope
and application"); Minda, supra note 78, at 999-1001 (urging courts to place greater
antitrust limitations on the right of groups to petition legislative bodies); David L. Meyer,
Note, A Standard for Tailoring Noerr-Pennington Immunity More Closely to the First
Amendment Mandate, 95 YALE L.J. 832,846 (1986) (arguing that under Noerr-Pennington,
"injury to competition is tolerated in situations where a more precise immunity standard
would minimize injury without endangering the ability of groups effectively to petition
government to take legitimate action").
164. See Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 122.
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undertaking the constitutional analysis associated with Noerr-
Pennington immunity."a  Second, a court would ask whether the
challenged conduct even qualified as petitioning or instead constituted
unethical conduct not entitled to any protection under the First
Amendment right to petition.' 66 Subsequent screens would test
whether the petitioning occurred in the legislative context (where it
would be presumptively immune), whether it represented primarily
political expression, and whether the petitioner genuinely sought the
government action requested. 67 Beyond the initial screen, however,
this sequential approach would do little more than clarify the different
elements that courts have found relevant in applying the sham
exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity; it would not overcome the
inherent difficulties that arise when trying to apply the sham
exception, particularly in the administrative context.
Under another suggested approach, the distinction between
"political" and "commercial" free speech, whatever that may be,'68
would be overlaid on the associated right to petition, thereby "dis-
tinguish[ing] attempts to influence administrative agencies in the
exercise of governmental policymaking functions from attempts to
influence administrative agencies in the exercise of proprietary or
commerce-regulating functions."' 69 Unless the proponents of such
165. See id. at 122-23 ("If there is no antitrust offense or injury-and even a truncated
analysis often will reveal this-the inquiry can end without the need for constitutional
analysis. For example, when petitioning is bona fide, the predatory intent usually
necessary for an antitrust violation will seldom be demonstrable.").
166. See id. at 123.
167. See id. at 124-25.
168. The suggested distinction between political and commercial speech is neither as
clear nor as significant as suggested. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech,
Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1340-45 (1988); Lars Noah
& Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech, 47 U. FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming
1995). First, traditionally safeguarded speech enjoys full protection notwithstanding the
fact that it pertains to some commercial activity; the mere existence of some underlying
profit motive does not trigger a lesser degree of constitutional scrutiny. See Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) ("Some of our most valued forms of fully
protected speech are uttered for a profit."). Second, even purely commercial speech is
entitled to some meaningful First Amendment protections. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1589-94 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993).
Third, even purely political speech and petitioning rights are not absolute. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1985).
169. Kaler, supra note 157, at 92; see also BORK, supra note 71, at 357-64 (proposing
a multi-factor analysis that would depend largely on the character of the governmental
process used and the decision sought by a petitioner); Natalie Abrams, Note, The Sham
Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A Commercial Speech Interpretation, 49
BROOK. L. REv. 573, 594-603 (1983) (proposing to overlay commercial free speech
doctrine on the right to petition). But see Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundations of Noerr-
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a distinction mean to suggest that commerce-regulating activities
generally would not be entitled to any Noerr-Pennington im-
munity,7' such an approach might actually prove to be even more
protective of sham petitioning before agencies. As previously
explained, a number of courts have lumped all agency proceedings
together on the adjudicative end of the spectrum,' meaning that
the sham exception may be applied more readily even in cases where
agencies actually are engaged in quasi-legislative decisionmaking. By
recognizing the essentially political character of petitioning in this
latter variety of proceedings, the proposed reforms would serve only
further to immunize potentially objectionable conduct in the ad-
ministrative setting." Moreover, although greater sensitivity to
these relevant differences in agency decisionmaking should be
applauded," it is doubtful that one can so readily demarcate
"governmental" and "commerce-regulating" functions or agencies. 4
Pennington and the Burden of Proving Sham Petitioning: The Historical-Constitutional
Argument in Favor of a "Clear and Convincing" Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 681, 709-13
(1994) (favoring an even narrower sham exception).
170. Although discussing one lower court decision holding that Noerr-Pennington
immunity was inapplicable because the agency officials were acting in a proprietary
(franchising) capacity, elsewhere Kaler states only that efforts to influence commerce-
regulating agencies "may" be subject to antitrust review and also that agency standards for
processing applications would simplify efforts to apply the sham exception. See Kaler,
supra note 157, at 93-95.
171. See supra note 128.
172. See BORK, supra note 71, at 362-63 ("Immunity is properly broader when the
framing of general rules is the object of the governmental process than when the force of
government is to be brought to bear on the specific rights of particular parties.").
173. See Handler & De Sevo, supra note 68, at 15 n.63 (describing zoning modifications,
tariff review, and franchising decisions as "a hybrid of legislative, judicial, and executive
conduct"); id. at 20 ("Because of the breadth and variety of the responsibilities of
[administrative] agencies, their actions can take on many of the attributes of the legislative
or judicial processes."); Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 82 ("Rulemaking by administrative
agencies is functionally comparable to the lawmaking function of legislatures, as are the
regulatory efforts of zoning commissions and similar boards at state and local levels.").
174. For instance, the FDA's primary mission is to safeguard consumers, United States
v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk .... 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969), but its product
approval systems, which are used to ensure public safety, could be characterized as
"commerce-regulating." Similarly, a distinction between legislative (rulemaking) and
adjudicative (licensing and product approval) functions seems equally inapt. Just as
incumbent firms may attempt to retard entry by filing objections to license applications,
they may also request rules of general applicability, which will work primarily to the
detriment of one or more potential competitors. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 124
n.266 ("[I]t will not always be immediately evident whether the process invoked was
legislative or administrative, such as where a firm presses for a favorable interpretation of
an administrative regulation."); supra note 26 (describing citizen petitions filed by drug
manufacturers requesting that the FDA apply stringent bioequivalence rules to generic
drug products).
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In any event, because it would only further narrow the range of cases
in which the sham exception might apply, drawing such a distinction
would not help to advance the goals of deterring abuse of the
regulatory process or promoting competition.
Under yet another approach, suggested by Professor Gary Minda,
a more selective application of Noerr-Pennington immunity would
allow increased antitrust scrutiny of petitioning in the legislative
arena.75  Professor Minda argues that the Supreme Court's as-
sumptions about the political process, especially the supposed benefits
of interest group pluralism, are unsupportable.76  Proceeding
instead from the insights of public choice theorists and other critics of
the pluralist tradition, Professor Minda urges enhanced antitrust
scrutiny of political lobbying pursued for anticompetitive ends and
relatively less attention paid to sham litigation, in effect reversing the
courts' greater willingness to apply the sham exception in the
adjudicatory context.'77 Along similar lines, he explains that "agencies
performing regulatory [as distinguished from adjudicatory] functions
may ... justify a more vigorous antitrust regulation policy.'
178
Although this approach would represent the most radical modification
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, even Professor Minda apparently
remains enamored of an antitrust fix.
175. See Minda, supra note 78, at 999-1028.
176. See id. at 933-35. He also challenges the First Amendment premises of Noerr-
Pennington, explaining that petitioning by incumbent firms may interfere with others' right
to petition. Id. at 1001-02.
177. Id. at 1022-23 ("Regulating predation through governmental process makes sense
in the legislative and quasi-legislative setting, but it makes little sense in the judicial and
quasi-judicial setting .... [Courts would be wise to get out of the business of relying upon
the antitrust laws to police bad faith litigation .... ."). Professor Minda reasons that "the
Supreme Court failed to consider... the real possibility that it may be easier to corrupt
the legislative spheres of government because, unlike the adjudicative spheres, legislative
bodies may lack adequate internal controls to check the raw political power of corporate
interests." Id. at 930. By contrast, petitioning in the adjudicatory branches of government
"is already highly regulated by a[n] elaborate system of legal rules and procedures
designed to monitor competing claims and interests." Id. at 971; see also Hurwitz, supra
note 72, at 110 (noting "the practical reality that legislators may have fewer resources for
determining the truth than do courts and agencies").
178. Minda, supra note 78, at 1023. Indeed, Professor Minda's proposed refocusing of
the sham exception would apply in the administrative context: "Governmental agencies
performing regulatory, as distinguished from adjudicatory, functions should be the subject
of higher antitrust scrutiny due to the greater likelihood of producer capture." Id. at 1024.
Frank Easterbrook drew the opposite conclusion from similar assumptions about agency
capture, arguing that antitrust law has no place in handling alleged abuses of the
administrative process because Congress may have given regulated firms a political victory,
intending that the administrative process be used to reduce competition. See Easterbrook,
supra note 74, at 98-99.
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2. Alternatives to Antitrust
Whether or not one shares these commentators' optimism about
the possibility for various types of doctrinal reform, the assumption
that antitrust is the best mechanism for protecting the integrity of the
regulatory process remains questionable. As one court recognized,
"[t]he antitrust laws were never meant to be a panacea for all
wrongs."'79  Even if agencies themselves encounter difficulties in
policing their own processes, antitrust is not the only remedy
available. For instance, plaintiffs instead may be able to assert
common law tort claims against competitors for malicious prosecution
or abuse of process.' 8° Indeed, the Supreme Court recently com-
pared the probable cause test of the sham exception to the tort of
malicious prosecution.' Some lower courts have analogized the
sham exception to tort claims for abuse of process," and both mali-
cious prosecution and abuse of process claims can arise from the
institution of administrative proceedings."8' Others have registered
179. Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 368
U.S. 944 (1961); see also Easterbrook, supra note 74, at 94 ("The antitrust laws are not
designed for all social ills. Antitrust protects the operation of private markets, not the
operation of government."); Minda, supra note 78, at 1000 ("Antitrust regulation of
petitioning activity in the governmental sphere would transform the Sherman Act into a
new ethical code for regulating political behavior as such."). Moreover, the Department
of Justice and the FTC may not be well situated to proceed against alleged sham
petitioning. See Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 121 ("[E]ven assuming Noerr's boundaries are
perfectly drawn, there nonetheless remain significant policy, resource, and practical
constraints on the ability of federal antitrust agencies to redress abusive invocations of
governmental process.").
180. See Handler & De Sevo, supra note 68, at 14 ("The sham exception was never
intended as a replacement for the[se] common law remedies .... Antitrust is too
cumbersome an instrument to be used to monitor litigation between competitors. Nor is
there any need for it to be so used."); see also John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation:
A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433, 437-56
(1986); Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts
and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86
HARV. L. REV. 715, 726-35 (1973).
181. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 1920, 1929 & n.7 (1993).
182. See, eg., Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.
1982) ("The existence of a tort of abuse of process shows that it has long been thought
that litigation could be used for improper purposes even when there is probable cause for
the litigation.. . ."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); see also Easterbrook, supra note 74,
at 94 ("[T]he common law tort of abuse of process is better for the job."); id. at 100 ("The
tort of abuse of process offers a useful way to strike the balance.").
183. See, e.g., Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 536 F.2d 838,847 (9th Cir. 1976) (Patent
Office proceeding); Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426-27 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (dealing with
instigation of baseless revocation proceedings before licensing authority); Harrison v.
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skepticism, however, about the possible utility of such tort claims as
an alternative to antitrust review through the sham exception1&4
One advocate for doctrinal reform simply asserts that "[t]he
inability of the regulatory agencies themselves to promulgate new
regulations which would effectively 'maintain the integrity' of their
administrative processes necessitates greater reliance on the antitrust
laws for this purpose.' '1" Another commentator speculates that
"many regulatory programs apparently are too new and complex to
have developed effective protections against abuse., 8 6 Interesting-
ly, this lack of confidence in agencies' abilities to control participants
sometimes is echoed by the agencies themselves. In one antitrust
case, the ICC filed an amicus brief urging the court to find that
deliberate misrepresentations to the Agency could provide the
predicate for liability under the Sherman Act; the ICC explained that,
because" 'many government agencies the size of the [ICC] have only
a small staff to monitor the actions of litigants,' "the threat of treble
damages might help deter wrongdoing.Y This position was
Howard Univ., 846 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1993) (zoning); Lewis v. Lhu, 696 F. Supp. 723,
728 (D.D.C. 1988) (FCC lottery).
184. See, e.g., Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663
F.2d 253, 263 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to interpret the sham exception by reference
to torts of malicious prosecution or abuse of process), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982);
Kaler, supra note 157, at 81-84; see also Myers, supra note 151, at 1242-46 (suggesting that
the First Amendment basis underlying the Court's recent decision in Professional Real
Estate Investors would limit the scope of this tort action in a similar manner, namely by
requiring both objective baselessness and subjective bad faith).
185. Kaler, supra note 157, at 91-92 (footnote omitted). Kaler recognizes that "the first
amendment does not preclude the government from adopting reasonable rules for
regulating the conduct of those who attempt to influence it." Id. at 91. He also notes that
"[t]he more specific the agency standards for evaluating claims and processing applications,
the easier it will be for the courts to determine whether the alleged violators in sham
exception cases are actually engaged in bringing baseless claims." Id. at 95 (footnote
omitted). Nonetheless, Kaler takes the position that administrative inertia makes it
unlikely that agencies will modify their own procedures. See id. at 92 n.178. Of course a
similar charge could be leveled against courts that adhere to existing Noerr-Pennington
precedent, but this point would hardly prove that suggestions for doctrinal reform are
misplaced.
186. Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 70 ("The absence of such internal protections may have
aggravated both the frequency of abuse and the magnitude of its effects.").
187. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240, 1262
n.34 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting ICC Amicus Brief, Clipper Exxpress (No. 78-3684)), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). More recently, an ICC official took the position that sham
petitioning before the Commission was a thing of the past. See Letter from Henri F. Rush,
General Counsel, ICC, to author (Nov. 8, 1994) ("In my experience, the only area that
suffered from a true problem of 'sham petitioning' was the trucking application docket.




especially remarkable because the Commission long ago had adopted
its own code of ethics for attorneys practicing before it.'"
Others have expressed less pessimism about agencies' capabilities
to police their own procedures. 9 As this Article discusses more
fully in the next Part, agencies can impose sanctions to combat mis-
representations and other conduct that may taint the administrative
process.' 9  Instead of allowing courts in antitrust litigation to
conclude, for instance, that the FDA and DEA have been unwitting
pawns in competitive struggles between pharmaceutical companies,
these and other agencies must, in the first instance, decide what sorts
of conduct they will tolerate by parties to their administrative
proceedings. Only if an agency then is unable to react effectively to
abuses of its procedures should courts intercede. Otherwise, antitrust
litigation would permit collateral attacks against final decisions in
cases where the responsible agency found no reason to object to the
parties' conduct. Even one of the commentators favoring doctrinal
antitrust reforms concurred with this point, concluding that "the
primary responsibility for protecting the integrity of governmental
processes lies with the relevant governmental bodies themselves."''
This has not, however, been the focus of recent commentary on sham
petitioning in the administrative context, with scholars preferring
instead to continue tinkering with Noerr-Pennington immunity.
The antitrust laws, while perhaps a useful adjunct for the most
blatant abuses of regulatory procedure, can never substitute for active
policing by agencies to maintain the integrity of their own processes.
This is not to say, as other commentators have suggested, that
antitrust scrutiny should have no place in cases where an abuse of
188. See 49 C.F.R. § 1103.10-.35 (1994); Code of Ethics of Practitioners Before Interstate
Commerce Commission, 17 A.B.A. J. 73 (1931).
189. See Handler & De Sevo, supra note 68, at 11 (observing that "administrative
bodies are [not] powerless to protect themselves against such misbehavior"); Hurwitz,
supra note 72, at 122 ("There will be exceptions, of course, such as when an agency is
derelict in protecting its own processes or lacks sufficiently stringent or comprehensive
remedial authority, but these situations probably will arise infrequently.").
190. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 122 ("The fact that an agency does not act
against an alleged abuse of its procedures should raise an inference that there was no
abuse. Conversely, if an agency penalizes an abuse, it presumably applies the remedy it
deems most appropriate to redress the situation.").
191. Id. at 126. Hurwitz suggests that "[flines for repeated filing of frivolous claims,
awards of attorneys' fees, requirements for more detailed pleading, stricter standing and
summary disposition standards, peer review and malpractice liability for filing frivolous
cases, and expanded use of business tort causes of action are all possibilities." Id.
(footnote omitted).
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process has been alleged." Because of the significant potential for
economic gain, ordinary penalties imposed by agencies may fail to
deter abuse of process in pursuit of anticompetitive ends."9 Instead,
the problem is that the sham exception, because of its narrow scope,
should not be relied upon as the primary mechanism for controlling
sham petitioning. Administrative agencies must assume greater
responsibility for policing the conduct of participants in regulatory
proceedings. Apart from better minimizing the occasions for
anticompetitive use, more clearly articulated limitations on the use of
agency processes should significantly promote the ability of the courts
to apply the sham exception, and possibly to impose antitrust
sanctions, in cases of especially serious abuse.
III. POSSIBLE REFORMS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Given the various shortcomings of antitrust law, and barring any
dramatic modifications in the application of Noerr-Pennington
immunity or the sham exception, one should pay greater attention to
possible reforms in administrative procedures as a way to combat
potential abuses of the regulatory process. Such efforts might fall into
two broad categories: (1) controls on the conduct of petitioners and
other participants in agency proceedings, and (2) direct limitations on
the opportunity to participate. This Article will address each general
approach in turn. The rules of professional responsibility and
certification requirements modeled on Rule 11 might provide a partial
solution, but ultimately more stringent restrictions on participation
seem necessary to combat sham petitioning in the regulatory process.
A. Controls on the Conduct of Participants
If agencies wish to minimize anticompetitive manipulation of
their procedures, they may attempt to regulate the conduct of entities
192. See Stephen Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the First Amendment: The
Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTrRUST LJ. 327, 344 n.87 (1988) ("If non-antitrust laws
adequately deter lobbying abuses, the deterrence purpose of antitrust... does not justify
applying it here. If deterrence is inadequate, something more than occasional antitrust
exposure is needed."); Easterbrook, supra note 74, at 94, 98-99 (same); Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Developments in the Noerr Doctrine, 56 ANTITRUST L.i. 361, 362 (1987) ("Both
the political process and litigation can be and are policed through norms specifically
designed to deal with corrupt practices and abuse of process."); Note, Application of the
Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847, 850
(1968) (arguing that "use of the Sherman Act as a vehicle for regulation of lobbying whose
object is anticompetitive would be an irrationally piecemeal way to deal with lobbying
abuses").
193. Elhauge, supra note 72, at 1221.
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seeking to participate in administrative proceedings. Although the
rules of professional responsibility generally are applicable to
attorneys practicing before federal agencies, these rules do not
provide sufficient protection against dilatory and misleading submis-
sions. Thus, agencies may need to adopt and vigorously enforce
certification requirements akin to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as one method of guarding against sham petitioning.
1. Rules of Professional Responsibility
Attorneys representing clients before agencies are subject to the
same ethical obligations that govern their conduct before courts. In
most jurisdictions, these include duties of candor to the tribunal,194
with correlative prohibitions against unnecessary delays or harassment
of other parties. Rule 3.1 of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct directs that "a lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for
doing so that is not frivolous."' 95  In addition, under the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility "a lawyer shall not ... delay a
trial... when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."'96 Although
these rules are framed in terms of conduct during the course of
litigation before courts, they have equal application to adjudicatory
proceedings before agencies.
Attorneys enjoy somewhat greater latitude in administrative
proceedings that are not regarded as adjudicatory. Rule 3.9 of the
Model Rules directs advocates in nonadjudicative proceedings before
agencies to conform to the duties regarding candor to the tribunal,
fairness to the opposing party and counsel, and the impartiality and
decorum of the tribunal. 97  Notably missing from Rule 3.9,
194. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.3 (1983) (prohibiting, inter
alia, the knowing submission of false information by a lawyer to a tribunal). Attorneys
must also promote the impartiality and decorum of the tribunal, id. Rule 3.5 (prohibiting
bribery and ex parte communications), and act with fairness to the opposing party and
counsel, id. Rule 3.4 (prohibiting, inter alia, the destruction of evidence).
195. Id. Rule 3.1. The accompanying Comment explains that attorneys have "a duty
not to abuse legal procedure."
196. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1986); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.2 (1993) ("A lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."). The
accompanying Comment explains that "[r]ealizing financial or other benefit from otherwise
improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client."
197. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.9 ("A lawyer representing a
client before a legislative or administrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall
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however, are cross-references to Rules 3.1 and 3.2, which respectively
proscribe frivolous claims and other conduct designed to delay or
harass.'98 Nonetheless, Rule 3.9 does not countenance conduct by
lawyers in nonadjudicative proceedings that would be regarded as
objectionable in adjudicative proceedings. As explained in the
accompanying Comment, agencies "should be able to rely on the
integrity of submissions made to it."'99
Although the precise contours of these ethical duties may vary
depending on whether the agency proceeding is considered adjudica-
tive or legislative," an attorney generally is expected to act no dif-
ferently than he or she would act when representing a client in
court.2m In practice, however, these rules of professional respon-
sibility may be viewed as somewhat less stringent in the administrative
context than in the judicial:'
disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the
provisions of Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c), and 3.5.").
198. See id.; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING 704-05 (2d ed. 1990) ("[T]he political arena countenances all manner of
argumentation and appeals to emotion. Rule 3.1, proscribing frivolous argumentation, is
accordingly inapplicable and was deliberately omitted from the list of cross-references.").
199. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 3.9 cmt. (1983) ("A lawyer
appearing before such a body should deal with the tribunal honestly and in conformity
with applicable rules of procedure.").
200. See Craig H. Allen, Attorney Ethics and Agency Practice: Representing Clients in
Coast Guard Marine Casualty Investigations, 22 J. MAR. L. & COM. 225,240-41 (1991) ("If
the administrative agency is conducting an adjudication ... the proceeding is adversarial
and the attorney acts as an advocate[,] ... [but] [p]ractices which would be appropriate
in an adversarial adjudication may be wholly out of place in a nonadjudicative investigative
proceeding."). As noted in connection with the distinction drawn for purposes of Noerr-
Pennington immunity, however, agency proceedings span a wide spectrum. See supra notes
130-31, 173-74 and accompanying text.
201. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 3.9 cmt. (1983)
("[A]dministrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal
with courts."). Indeed, the ABA's predecessor Model Code, which remains in use in
several jurisdictions, GeoffreyJ. Ritts, Professional Responsibility and the Conflict of Laws,
18 J. LEGAL PROF. 17, 18-19 (1993), did not draw any clear distinction between
adjudicative and nonadjudicative proceedings before agencies. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-15 (1980) ("[A lawyer] appearing before an
administrative agency, regardless of the nature of the proceeding it is conducting, has the
continuing duty to advance the cause of his client within the bounds of the law."); cf id.
EC 7-16 ("When a lawyer appears in connection with proposed legislation, he... should
comply with applicable laws and legislative rules."); In re Richmond, 591 P.2d 728, 731
(Or. 1979) (per curiam) (drawing a distinction between adjudication and rulemaking in
applying a disciplinary rule governing "administrative proceeding[s]").
202. See Allen, supra note 200, at 225 ("It is less well known that most of those same
rules [of ethical conduct in litigation] apply while representing clients before administrative
agencies."); Steven H. Leleiko, Professional Responsibility and Public Policy Formation,
49 ALB. L. REV. 403, 427 (1985); cf. CHARLES A. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER
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Advocates before government agencies are prone to assume
that a less rigorous standard of truthfulness and fair dealing
is expected because they are operating within a highly
politicized process. The absence of the traditional checks
and atmosphere of adjudicatory tribunals contributes to this
feeling. In a nonadjudicatory environment in which bias
may be more important than actual facts, there is a predilec-
tion to sacrifice facts and at times to provide misleading
information.'
In fact, some have suggested that Rule 3.9 might apply only to
conduct during trial-type hearings in nonadjudicative proceedings
before agencies,' an interpretation that would leave a large class
of regulatory submissions prepared by attorneys wholly exempt from
the rules of professional responsibility. Other commentators have
argued that conduct during informal, nonadjudicative proceedings
should be governed by stricter rather than lesser ethical standards
precisely because of the absence of any opportunity for testing
through an adversarial presentation of evidence and arguments.t °5
Whatever their precise contours, the ethical obligations of
attorneys apparently will not suffice to prevent abuse of the
regulatory process. Several agencies have adopted or incorporated by
reference the rules of professional responsibility, at least with respect
to conduct during formal administrative hearings.' A number of
federal agencies prohibit participation by attorneys who have been
53-56, 104-06 (1952) (describing ambiguities in applying ABA's former Canons of
Professional Ethics to the conduct of lawyers before legislative and administrative bodies).
203. Leleiko, supra note 202, at 422-23; see also Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 69
("Aggressively self-serving petitions, objections, and arguments are the norm, and the
visible bounds of 'proper' conduct are faint at best."); Philip J. Harter, Negotiated
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 19 (1982) (noting that, in rulemaking,
"parties tend to take extreme positions, expecting that they may be pushed toward the
middle").
204. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 750-51 (1986) (focusing on
the use of the term "tribunal" in the Rules cross-referenced in Rule 3.9).
205. See, e.g., Harold L. Marquis, An Appraisal of Attorneys' Responsibilities Before
Administrative Agencies, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 285, 285-86, 313-14 (1976).
206. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1.26(b)(1) (1995) (USDA); 16 C.F.R. § 4.1(e)(1) (1995) ("All
attorneys practicing before the [FTC] shall conform to the standards of ethical conduct
required of practitioners in the courts of the United States and by the bars of which the
attorneys are members."); 40 C.F.R. § 164.30 (1994) (EPA); 47 C.F.R. § 1.24(2) (1994)
(FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1103.10 (1994) (ICC); see also L. Harold Levinson, Professional
Responsibility Issues in Administrative Adjudication, 2 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 219,242-49 (1988)
(describing enforcement of attorney codes of conduct by administrative law judges).
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suspended or disbarred by a court,2°7 and courts have upheld agency
orders preventing attorneys found guilty of misconduct from further
practice before the agency for a period of time.' 3 As previously
explained, however, these rules of conduct are somewhat unclear
when applied in the administrative context.
In addition to the looser norms of behavior that exist, federal
agencies have only limited direct powers to discipline attorneys for
violations of the rules of professional responsibility. 9 Although
agencies are free to refer disciplinary matters to state bar
authorities,21 Congress has expressly conferred authority to set
attorney admission requirements on only a few agencies,211 and the
Agency Practice Act expressly prevents most federal agencies from
establishing separate limitations on appearances by attorneys. 21 2
Furthermore, parties often appear before agencies without legal
207. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(7) (1995) (INS); 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(2) (1994) (SEC);
31 C.F.R. § 10.51(g) (1994) (IRS).
208. See, eg., Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 320 (1949) (per curiam) (upholding
sanction for filing misleading information with PTO); Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d
1053, 1057-61 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same); Polydoroff v. ICC, 773 F.2d 372, 374-75 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (upholding ICC's six month suspension order). For instance, agencies may disqualify
attorneys from further participation in a particular proceeding in the event of misconduct.
See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1.141(d) (1995) (USDA); 10 C.F.R. § 2.713(c) (1995) (NRC); 16 C.F.R.
§ 1502.28 (1995) (CPSC); 31 C.F.R. § 10.51 (1994) (IRS); 47 C.F.R. § 1.1216(a), (d) (1994)
(FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 511.76 (1994) (NHTSA); see also Ubiotica Corp. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 376,
382 (6th Cir. 1970) (stating that counsel was properly excluded from further participation
in hearing for conduct deemed "dilatory, recalcitrant, obstructive of orderly process, and
contemptuous").
209. See Michael P. Cox, Regulation of Attorneys Practicing before Federal Agencies,
34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 195-205,206-07 (1983-84). "Although extensive misconduct
by attorneys before federal agencies has not been documented to date," Professor Cox
argues that the Office of Government Ethics should promulgate uniform standards of
conduct for attorneys participating in the regulatory process. Id. at 224.
210. See Allen, supra note 200, at 238 & n.93 (Although "a federal agency may not
establish requirements for practice beyond membership in a state bar, it can disqualify an
attorney from further practice before the agency and/or file a complaint with the attorney's
state bar association for ethics violations."); Levinson, supra note 206, at 241 ("An ad-
ministrative law judge who knows that an attorney has engaged in Misconduct may refer
the matter to state bar authorities .. ").
211. See 31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1988) (Department of Treasury); 35 U.S.C. §§ 31,32 (1988)
(Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)); 43 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) (Department of Interior).
Courts also have found implied delegations of such authority in some instances. See, e.g.,
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 577-78, 582 (2d Cir. 1979).
212. See 5 U.S.C. § 500(b), (e) (1994) (exempting PTO); H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) ("The bill would do away with agency-established admission re-
quirements for licensed attorneys, and thus allow persons to be represented before
agencies by counsel of their choice.").
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representation, 13 so the ethical obligations of lawyers would have
no direct application to their conduct.214 Finally, it must be remem-
bered that the rules of professional responsibility only set the outer
boundaries for ethical behavior where transgressions may trigger
severe disciplinary sanctions. In recognition of this limitation, courts
have chosen to establish more demanding rules of conduct designed
to preserve the integrity of the litigation process, most notably Rule
11. A similar approach may be necessary in the agency context.
2. Certification Requirements
Just as courts have been forced to develop separate rules of
conduct and accompanying sanctions to address real or perceived
abuses in the context of litigation,215 agencies may choose to es-
tablish and enforce similar controls over participants in the ad-
ministrative arena. Certification rules are the most common method,
typically requiring that each submission be signed by a party or its
attorney, in effect as an attestation that the filing is brought in good
faith. For instance, any document filed with the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) must be signed by a party or its represen-
tative, and this signature "represents that the signer has read [the
document] and that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information
and belief, the statements made in it are true and that it is not filed
for purposes of delay." '216 Such a requirement of good faith in
making allegations does not, however, necessarily create a duty to
213. Several agencies explicitly authorize representation of parties by non-lawyers. See
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(a) (1994) (SEC); 18 C.F.R. § 385.210(a), (b) (1995) (FERC); 21 C.F.R.
§ 1316.50 (1995) (DEA); Levinson, supra note 206, at 252-54; Marlene M. Remmert, Note,
Representation of Clients before Administrative Agencies: Authorized or Unauthorized
Practice of Law?, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 567,599-602 (1981); Gregory T. Stevens, Note, The
Proper Scope of Nonlawyer Representation in State Administrative Proceedings: A State
Specific Balancing Approach, 43 VAND. L. REV. 245 (1990).
214. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.9 cmt. (1983) ("Lawyers
have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court.
The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable
to advocates who are not lawyers.").
215. See, e.g., Judith R. McMorrow, Rule 11 and the Federalization of Ethics, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 959, 981; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 799, 803 (1992).
216. 16 C.F.R. § 1025.14(d)(2) (1995); see also 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(15)(i) (1995).(INS);
10 C.F.R. § 2.708(c) (1995) (NRC); 13 C.F.R. § 134.15 (1995) (SBA); 14 C.F.R. § 302.4(b)
(1995) (DOT); 16 C.F.R. § 4.2(e)(2) (1995) (FTC); 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(a) (1994) (PTO); 40
C.F.R. § 22.05(c)(3) (1994) (EPA); 49 C.F.R. § 511.14(d)(2) (1994) (NHTSA); 49 C.F.R.
§ 1104.4(a) (1994) (ICC).
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investigate or confirm that the allegations are well-founded.217
Some agencies only require certification that the contents of a
document are accurate,218 and others have more general directives
against causing unreasonable delay.219 Several agencies do not have
any sort of certification rules in place.'
Agency certification requirements like the CPSC's are modeled
in large part on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Until recently, Rule 11 provided in relevant part as follows:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion,
or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."
Although the Rule was substantially revised in 1993, its basic certifica-
tion requirement remains intact.' The application of Rule 11 has
217. See Manso, supra note 72, at 135. Indeed, it may be unrealistic to expect this of
attorneys who practice before regulatory bodies, which may demand technically complex
economic or scientific data in submissions.
218. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 385.2005 (1995) (FERC); 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(b) (1995) (FDA).
Moreover, it is a crime for any person intentionally to make a false statement or represen-
tation to a federal agency. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 200.311 (1994) (SEC);
21 C.F.R. § 10.20(i) (1995) (FDA); 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (1994) (PTO); 47 C.F.R. § 1.743(d)
(1994) (FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1104.5(c) (1994) (ICC); 50 Fed. Reg. 11,030, 11,031 (1985)
(NRC).
219. See, eg., 31 C.F.R. § 10.23 (1994) (IRS); 37 C.F.R. § 10.85(a)(1) (1994) (PTO).
Agencies sometimes also impose heightened pleading requirements for certain types of
petitions; for instance, demanding that objections be set forth with specificity. See, e.g., 10
C.F.R. § 2.714(b)(2) (1995) (NRC); 16 C.F.R. § 1502.6(a)(5) (1995) (CPSC).
220. See, e.g., 9 C.F.R. §§ 1.28, 1.143 (1995) (USDA); 10 C.F.R. § 205.9(b) (1995)
(DOE); 17 C.F.R. § 13.2 (1994) (CFTC); 17 C.F.R. § 202.6-.7 (1994) (SEC).
221. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 167 (1983). When a violation
occurred, courts were directed to impose "an appropriate sanction," such as payment of
the other party's reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred because of the filing. Id.
"Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition
of sanctions when appropriate should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses." Id. advisory
committee's note to 1983 amendment. The Supreme Court recently analogized the sham
exception's baselessness criterion to the test under Rule 11, Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1930-31 (1993), while
some commentators have noted that Rule 11 is an alternative to antitrust scrutiny of sham
litigation, see Hurwitz, supra note 72, at 126 n.270; Minda, supra note 78, at 973 n.235.
222. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 421 (1993); Carl Tobias,
The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 192 (1994); Georgene M. Vairo,
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attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in the past several
years.' Many of these comments and criticisms apply less readily
to agency certification requirements, but a few are cogent.
A number of commentators have complained that Rule 11,
especially insofar as it prohibits claims unwarranted by existing law,
inappropriately chills the efforts of litigants to protect their rights. 2
In a related vein, many of the difficulties encountered in attempts to
define "sham" petitions in the antitrust context, such as trying to
identify objective baselessness and subjective bad faith in regulatory
submissions, arise when one tries to deter frivolous claims and
dilatory tactics in litigation. Arguably, for the same reasons that
the First Amendment limits the permissible application of the
Sherman Act, one could not sanction bad faith petitions unless they
were also objectively baseless 2P In any event, the resultant uncer-
tainty may discourage persons from asserting legitimate claims.
Another frequent complaint against Rule 11, which prompted the
1993 amendments, concerned the emergence of "satellite" litigation
triggered by parties seeking sanctions against one another.
The New Rule 11: Past As Prologue?, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 41 (1994).
223. See, e.g., GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION
ABUSE (2d ed. 1994); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW,
PERSPECrIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES (2d ed. 1993).
224. See, e.g., Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22
VAL. U. L. REV. 331, 333-34 (1988); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Rule 11 and Federal Antitrust
Litigation, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1033, 1043-54 (1993); Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and
Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 961, 971 (1992); Melissa L. Nelken, Has the
Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 394 (1990); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal
Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1338-52 (1986); Mark S. Stein, Of Impure Hearts and
Empty Heads: A Hierarchy of Rule 11 Violations, 31 SANWA CLARA L. REV. 393, 413-14
(1991); Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429,
440 (1992); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where Are We and Where Are We Going, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 475,483-86 (1991).
225. See, e.g., George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to Amendment, 61 MISS. L.J. 5,8-9
(1991); Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A
Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 1067,
1073 (1994).
226. See Myers, supra note 151, at 1246-50 (arguing that the constitutional basis of the
Court's decision in Professional Real Estate Investors should have equal application to Rule
11 sanctions); Thies K611n, Comment, Rule 11 and the Policing of Access to the Courts after
Professional Real Estate Investors, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1063-67 (1994) (same); cf.
Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing imposition of Rule
11 sanctions for the assertion of non-frivolous claims even though admittedly motivated
in part by an improper purpose).
227. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment ("The
revision broadens the scope of this [certification] obligation, but places greater constraints
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Although satellite litigation is less likely to pose a problem in the
administrative context, especially if agency staff rather than parties
are given the primary task of policing for violations of the certification
rules, it still might result in a significant diversion of agency effort and
scarce resources.
If Rule 11 were adapted to administrative procedures, as it
already has been to a limited extent, perhaps the most important issue
would concern the appropriate type of penalties to deter abuses.
Certification rules will work only if violators fear sanctions for
improper submissions. A few agencies' regulations provide that
documents "may be stricken as a sham" in the case of a violation of
the certification requirements," and attorneys may be subject to
appropriate disciplinary action for willful violations. 9  Even so,
agency enforcement of these standards may be rare or haphazard,"0
and other certification rules are notable for the complete absence of
any enforcement sanctions."3
on the imposition of sanctions and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions
presented to the court."); Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating
Lawyer Performance: Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REV. 575,647-53 (1987) (discussing
emergence of satellite litigation); William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1013, 1017-18 (1988) (same).
228. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.708(c) (1995) (NRC); 16 C.F.R' § 4.3(e)(2) (1995) (FTC);
47 C.F.R. § 1.52 (1994) (FCC). Similar sanctions apply in cases of improper ex parte
communications. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(D) (1994) (a party's claim or interest in an
adjudicatory proceeding may be "dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise adversely
affected on account of such violation"); Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA,
685 F.2d 547,564 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (summarizing factors to consider when addressing objec-
tions about ex parte contacts); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States Dep't of
Energy, 769 F.2d 771,792-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding agency order precluding assertion
of affirmative defenses as sanction for noncompliance with discovery order).
229. See, e.g, 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(15)(i) (1995) (INS); 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(b) (1994)
(PTO); 47 C.F.R. § 1.52 (1994) (FCC).
230. See Arthur Best, Shortcomings of Administrative Agency Lawyer Discipline, 31
EMORY L.J. 535, 538-45, 596 (1982) (discussing examples involving the FCC and asserting
that "agencies may be markedly inefficient in exercising th[eir] responsibility" to discipline
lawyers for disorderly conduct during proceedings); Cox, supra note 209, at 213
("Standards without effective enforcement benefit no one."); Manso, supra note 72, at 135
(noting that in most cases opposing parties will be disinclined to bring motions to strike
or suspend). For example, in issuing its final decision withdrawing approval of an animal
drug, the FDA made a passing reference to the unprecedented volume of exceptions filed
by the applicants in response to the ALJ's initial decision, adding simply that "[m]any
exceptions were frivolous or trivial." 56 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41,902 n.2 (1991). There was
no hint that the parties should have been sanctioned.
231. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1025.14(d) (1995) (CPSC); 18 C.F.R. § 385.2005 (1995)
(FERC); 49 C.F.R. § 511.14(d) (1994) (NHTSA); 49 C.F.R. § 1104.4 (1994) (ICC). It
should be noted, however, that some of these agencies nonetheless sometimes express
confidence in their ability to prevent sham petitioning. See Letter from Philip R. Recht,
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Instead of the piecemeal regulation of conduct by individual
agencies, Congress might consider amending the Agency Practice Act
to include a generally applicable certification requirement modeled on
Rule 11 that would mandate the imposition of substantial penalties,
including the possible forfeiture of an existing license or permit, in the
event of a violation.22 The possibility of serious sanctions against
incumbent firms, especially the risk of forfeiting licenses, should deter
sham petitioning in most cases. 3  The Administrative Procedure
Act broadly defines the term "sanction,"' but agencies generally
cannot sanction parties unless specifically authorized to do so by
statute. 5 A broad legislative solution may, therefore, be preferable
Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to author (Apr. 10, 1995) ("Occasionally, however, parties raise
what we consider to be baseless objections to a proposed action to retard market entry of
a potential competitor. We... believe that our current procedures effectively detect and
resolve any problems we encounter.") (on file with author).
232. See Manso, supra note 72, at 136-37; cf. Cox, supra note 209, at 225 ("Congress
also should amend the Agency Practice Act to provide for a uniform disciplinary process
... [because] allowing each agency to discipline its own practitioners perpetuates the lack
of uniformity among different agencies."); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics,
73 TEx. L. Rnv. 335,370-71 (1994) (recommending unification of federal agency and court
rules of attorney ethics).
233. See FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 228 (1946) (upholding FCC's decision to
refuse license renewal for radio station that had made misrepresentations to the
Commission, finding it an appropriate measure "to preserve the integrity of its own system
of reports"); Sea Island Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 240, 241-44 (D.C. Cir.)
(upholding FCC's revocation of AM radio station's operating license for misrepresen-
tations made to the agency to conceal fraudulent billings), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980);
10 C.F.R. § 205.203(b), (c) (1994) (providing that the DOE may impose civil or criminal
penalties on parties who violate agency rules).
234. The APA defines "sanction" to include:
the whole or part of an agency-(A) prohibition, requirement, limitation, or
other condition affecting the freedom of a person; (B) withholding of relief; (C)
imposition of penalty or fine; (D) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of
property; (E) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation,
costs, charges, or fees; (F) requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license; or
(G) taking other compulsory or restrictive action.
5 U.S.C. § 551(10) (1994).
235. See id. § 558(b) ("A sanction may not be imposed... except within jurisdiction
delegated to the agency and as authorized by law."); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 111-12
(1978) (holding that statute did not authorize a series of summary suspension orders);
Gold Kist, Inc. v. USDA, 741 F.2d 344, 348 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[Tlhe statute must plainly
establish a penal sanction in order for the agency to have authority to impose a penalty
."); Savage v. CFTC, 548 F.2d 192, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1977). But cf Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (discussing federal courts' inherent power to impose sanctions
for bad faith conduct in litigation), reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1269 (1991). Where Congress
has delegated such authority, courts defer to agencies' choice of sanctions. See, e.g., Butz
v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-88 (1973) (upholding suspension of
party for fraud in weighing livestock); Garver v. United States, 846 F.2d 1029, 1030 (6th
Cir.) (upholding suspension of party for willful violation of fair trade practices and prompt
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to existing controls on the conduct of participants. Although each
agency should retain the authority to supplement a uniform rule with
other procedural protections, and they would remain free to enforce
any general certification requirement in whatever way they saw fit,
the rule's deterrent effect ultimately would depend on consistent and
vigorous enforcement.
B. Direct Limitations on the Right to Participate
Although agencies might do well to demand closer adherence to
the rules of professional responsibility or impose certification
requirements akin to Rule 11, ultimately more stringent restrictions
on participation may be necessary to combat abuse of the regulatory
process. Sham petitioning is possible because agencies generally
welcome broad public participation in regulatory activities. Unlike
courts, which engage primarily in dispute resolution between private
litigants, administrative bodies focus on policymaking, most noticeably
when they promulgate rules of general application but also during the
course of adjudication. Thus, a relatively broader range of potentially
interested parties enjoys access to agencies than to courts.
As previously suggested, the largely unrestricted opportunity to
participate brings with it the possibility for strategic manipulation of
the regulatory process in pursuit of anticompetitive ends. Although
openness and accessibility have long been considered hallmarks of
good government, at some point rules favoring public participation
may become counterproductive. 6 The central question is whether
the potential harms associated with sham petitioning will ever
outweigh the values that are served by an open regulatory process.
pay mandate), cert denied, 488 U.S. 820 (1988); Chapman v. United States, 821 F.2d 523,
526-28 (10th Cir. 1987) (upholding imposition of fines for the filing of false Medicaid
claims); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NRC, 571 F.2d 1289, 1291-92 (4th Cir. 1978)
(upholding agency decision to impose only civil penalties but not revocation of license for
false statement in application).
236. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1993) (recommendation by the Administrative Conference
of the United States) ("In order that agencies may effectively exercise their powers and
duties in the public interest, public participation in agency proceedings should neither
frustrate an agency's control of the allocation of its resources nor unduly complicate and
delay its proceedings."); id. § 305.86-7 ("Reducing the delay, expense and unproductive
legal maneuvering found in many [agency] adjudications is recognized as a crucial factor
in achieving substantive justice."); Miller, supra note 43, at 905 ("At some stage
enhancement of the administrative process turns into harassment, and protecting the ability




If sham petitioning before agencies poses a sufficiently serious
problem, lawmakers could respond by placing direct limitations on the
right to participate. At the extreme, persons could be excluded
altogether from administrative proceedings unless they assert a direct
and immediate interest in the subject of those proceedings. For a
variety of reasons, it seems unrealistic to exclude persons altogether
simply because they have a financial stake in the outcome of the
proceeding, though one could imagine such a restriction in limited
types of administrative proceedings. For instance, an agency might
permit only the individual or firm holding a license to appear in a
revocation hearing; competitors would not be allowed to intervene in
the proceeding to argue in favor of the proposed revocation.
Less radical approaches might limit the procedural rights of
potential intervenors, perhaps by allowing only written submissions
and only with regard to certain relevant issues. Reforms of this sort
might help reduce incumbent firms' opportunities to retard market
entry or achieve other anticompetitive goals through the use of the
regulatory process. Because agency procedures and problems are so
variable, it is difficult to propose any uniform solutions. Nonetheless,
one can suggest certain general improvements. Before desgribing
these reforms in any greater detail, however, it is necessary to
anticipate and respond to likely objections, including challenges based
on both constitutional and existing statutory rights.
1. Constitutional Obstacles
At the outset, constitutional protections for the right to petition
and due process may constrain wholesale reforms limiting com-
petitors' rights to participate in agency proceedings. As explained
previously, Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity is founded on the
First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. 7 As suggested in California Motor Transport, however,
an unfettered First Amendment right to petition might implicate other
persons' rights by hindering meaningful access to the organs of
government.23s The Supreme Court has not fully elaborated the
237. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
238. 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); see also id. at 515 (conceding that "any carrier has the
right of access to agencies and courts, within the limits, of course, of their prescribed
procedures, in order to defeat applications of its competitors" (emphasis added)); Minda,
supra note 78, at 1001 (noting that petitioning activities by incumbent firms may interfere
with the First Amendment rights of other parties).
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scope of this particular right, 9 but the Constitution clearly does not
prevent Congress from imposing some limits on citizens' access to
government officials.2'
Interested third parties who would be excluded from agency
proceedings under the suggested reforms also might challenge them
on due process grounds, but such an objection seems equally
unavailing for a number of reasons. First, the Due Process Clause
applies only in cases of agency adjudication.241 This distinction is
grounded in part on the sheer impracticality of giving every person
who is potentially affected by a decision of general application a
direct voice in the matter.242 Licensing proceedings generally are
regarded as adjudicatory,243 but rulemaking and other agency actions
would not trigger due process protections.
Second, even in the case of adjudicatory proceedings, the indirect
beneficiaries of a government program generally lack a protectible
property interest.244 Although licenses issued by government are
regarded as property under the due process clause,245 only the
person whose license or application is at issue would have a suf-
239. See Edmund G. Brown, The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom?, 8
UCLA L. REv. 729,730,733-34 (1961); Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging
... ": An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1153, 1183-94 (1986); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to
Petition for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J 142, 165-66 (1986).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1954) (upholding Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act against First Amendment challenge); Myers, supra note 151,
at 1241 (explaining that the right to petition is not absolute but instead must be balanced
against countervailing values); cf. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1985) (stating
that libelous correspondence with public officials not absolutely protected by right to
petition); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) ("[B]aseless
litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.").
241. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,284-85
(1984); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244-45 (1973); Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 373,385-86 (1908); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative
State, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1044, 1116-19 (1984).
242. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915) ("There
must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to go on.").
243. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
244. See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 786-89 (1980); cf.
American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532,538-39 (1970) (holding that
ICC could ignore rule when it was not intended to confer any procedural benefits on
carriers objecting to another company's application for temporary operating authority).
245. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (holding that occupational license
constituted property); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977) (holding that commercial
driver's licenses constituted property); Industrial Safety Equip. Ass'n v. EPA, 837 F.2d
1115, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that product certification constituted property).
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ficiently direct interest in the proceeding to trigger due process
rights.2' For instance, in the hypothetical discussed above, Alpha
Pharmaceuticals might have a constitutional right to raise objections
if FDA approval of Medica's application would violate Alpha's
statutory right to seven years of market exclusivity, but it would not
have a similar right to object on some other basis once this period has
expired.247 Mutually exclusive applications may require a compara-
tive hearing so that other applicants' hearing rights are not rendered
meaningless if the first application is granted,2' but otherwise a
competitor would have no constitutional right to participate.249
Finally, even if a firm could identify a sufficiently direct interest
in an adjudicatory proceeding, its rights to participate nonetheless
might be circumscribed without running afoul of the Due Process
Clause.' s Under the familiar three-pronged balancing test set out
in Mathews v. Eldridge,s' the third party's attenuated interest,
coupled with the minimal risk of an erroneous decision, probably will
pale against the government's interest in not providing additional
procedural safeguards. 2 In particular, courts may take into account
246. See United States v. Dixie Highway Express, 389 U.S. 409, 410-11 (1967) (per
curiam) (reversing lower court's decision that existing carriers enjoyed a property right
against competition if they were able to provide the proposed service); Wells Fargo
Armored Serv. Corp. v. Georgia PSC, 547 F2d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The mere entry
of another motor carrier into Wells Fargo's territory is too insubstantial an injury to its
existing, non-exclusive certificate to constitute a deprivation in the constitutional sense.").
247. See supra notes 18, 23, 25-27 and accompanying text.
248. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1945); Public Utils.
Comm'n v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 497
F.2d 608, 612-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 930 (1974).
249. See Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that
Ashbacker applies only to contemporaneous applications for mutually exclusive licenses
and does not provide comparative hearing rights to a subsequent applicant against an
existing licensee); Radio Athens, Inc. v. FCC, 401 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("There
must be some point in time when the Commission can close the door to new parties to a
comparative hearing or, at least hypothetically, no licenses could ever be granted.").
250. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972) ("Once it is determined that due
process applies, the question remains what process is due.").
251. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that courts must take account of, first, "the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest,
including ... fiscal and administrative burdens").
252. See, e.g., McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,
36-37 (1990); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11-19 (1979) (upholding automatic
temporary suspension of driver's license for refusal to take breath-analysis test after arrest
for driving while intoxicated); Moreau v. FERC, 982 F.2d 556, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding that land owners received adequate notice of company's plan to construct pipeline
adjacent to their property).
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the countervailing due process rights of existing parties to an
administrative proceeding (such as a firm seeking market entry),
especially where the participation by a third party (such as an
incumbent firm) would delay or otherwise interfere with the agency's
hearing.' Thus, just as is true with the right to petition, due
process rights may cut two ways.' Neither constitutional right
would appreciably limit the range of possible restrictions on par-
ticipation in agency proceedings.
2. Statutory Obstacles
Existing statutes present a more serious obstacle to agency-
initiated reforms to limit rights of participation. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),' 5 as well as many agencies' organic statutes,
requires or encourages broad-based public input and creates rights of
participation that exceed constitutionally required minima of due
process. For instance, when agencies promulgate rules, the APA
requires that they "give interested persons an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views,
253. See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 267 & n.3 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting employer's claim that it had right to a hearing before the Secretary of
Labor could order reinstatement of an employee, in part because the added delays would
adversely affect the employee's rights); Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 669
F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that restrictions on hearing of protests by certified
motor carriers to the granting of ICC certificates to additional carriers did not violate due
process); see also Todd D. Rakoff, Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., and the New Law of
Regulatory Due Process, 1987 Sup. Cr. REv. 157,192 ("[T]he reasoning in Brock highlights
the choice between throwing the burden of unwieldiness of procedure on one private party
or on the other."). Professor Rakoff argues that the Brock Court's "suggestion that the
interests of the employer and employee are, in this context, comparable and commen-
surable represents a considerable recasting of the law." Id. at 167.
254. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604,609-10 (1974) (noting that both
debtor and creditor had property interests at stake, the Court upheld use of sequestration
statute even though it did not provide debtor with a pre-deprivation hearing); Jim Walter
Resources, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 920 F.2d 738, 746 (11th
Cir. 1990) ("The government has a strong interest in ensuring that miners-who are
discharged by their employers for performing important 'whistle-blowing' functions-are
expeditiously reinstated to their jobs."); cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,300-03 (1981) (stating that the agency may dispense with
prior hearing in emergency situations); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 ("Significantly, the cost
of protecting those whom the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely
to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving since
resources available for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited.").
255. Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706 (1994)). See generally Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-40 (1950)
(discussing the history of APA's passage).
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or arguments.",1 6 The opportunity to comment on proposed rules
is not required by the Due Process Clause; instead, the statutory
requirement is premised on some of the same policies that underlie
the right to petition government for redress of grievances, such as
ensuring that agency decisionmakers receive valuable information
from the private sector z7  Some organic statutes require that
agencies abide by additional procedures when promulgating rules," s
and other agencies voluntarily may provide even more sweeping
procedural rights to protect their decisions against second-guessing by
reviewing courts. 9
The APA and a number of organic statutes also require that
federal agencies give interested persons the right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.' 60 Due to the lack of
256. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994); see also NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 n.18 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) ("Public participation in agency decision making is increasingly recognized as
a desirable objective."); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living
and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253,263 (1986) ("[P]ublic participation has deterred
the agencies from straying too far from their assigned missions.").
257. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(noting that rulemaking " 'assur[es] that the agency will have before it the facts and
information relevant to a particular administrative problem, as well as suggestions for
alternative solutions' " (citation omitted)). The right to comment sometimes also is
justified as a proxy for democratic processes when elected officials delegate power to
agencies. See Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694,703 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that notice-
and-comment rulemaking "reintroduc[es] public participation and fairness to affected
parties after governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies").
Whether or not this is true, allowing affected parties to participate may improve the
perceived legitimacy of the decisionmaking process. See Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA,
636 F.2d 464, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
258. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b), (c) (1988) (giving interested parties the right to make
oral arguments and conduct cross-examination at rulemaking hearings before the FTC);
15 U.S.C. § 2058(d) (1988) (CPSC); 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1988') (OSHA); 42 U.S.C. §
7607(d) (1988) (EPA). In rare cases, Congress has mandated formal (on-the-record)
rulemaking. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1988) (FDA). For further background
concerning these additional rulemaking procedures, see Stephen F. Williams, "Hybrid
Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42
U. CHI. L. REv. 401 (1975); Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules
of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative
Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1283-1313 (1972).
259. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,546-47 (1978)
("[T]he agencies, operating under [a] vague injunction to employ the 'best' procedures and
facing the threat of reversal if they did not, would undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory
procedures in every instance."); Gardner v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
("Once having stated that it will give such notice, the Commission has created a reasonable
expectation in the parties to the proceeding that such notice will be received.").
260. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994) (APA); 15 U.S.C. § 1410a (1988) (NHTSA,
motor vehicle safety standards); 15 U.S.C. § 2620 (1988) (EPA, toxic substances); 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(b) (1988) (FDA, food additive petitions); 49 U.S.C. § 10,326 (1988) (ICC, rail carrier
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clear procedures for responding to such submissions, the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States (ACUS) has recommended that
agencies "adopt measures that will ensure that the right to petition is
a meaningful one."26' A number of agencies now have detailed
procedures in place for responding to these so-called citizen
petitions,2 62 and incumbent firms sometimes use such petitions in
attempts to limit competition. 6'
The rules governing participation in adjudicatory proceedings are
similarly generous. The rights of interested parties to intervene in
agency hearings have steadily expanded over the last few decades.
Although it provides little guidance in this respect, the APA explicitly
allows an agency to admit any interested person "as a party for
limited purposes. '  Because organic statutes often employ vague
criteria governing intervention,2 s federal agencies enjoy significant
discretion in designing their procedures to allow participation by
interested third parties.
Traditionally, persons who were likely to suffer specific economic
injuries as a consequence of an agency decision were permitted to
intervene in administrative proceedings and granted standing to seek
transport).
261. 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-6 (1993) ("The existence of th[is] right to petition reflects the
value Congress has placed on public participation in the agency rulemaking process."); see
also William V. Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An Overview of
Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendations for Improvement, 1988
WIs. L. REv. 1, 25-26, 55-63 (canvassing values of this type of petitioning process).
262. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1.2-.8 (1995) (USDA); 10 C.F.R. § 2.802 (1995) (NRC); 14
C.F.R. § 11.25 (1995) (FAA); 16 C.F.R. § 1051.1-.11 (1995) (CPSC); 21 C.F.R. § 10.20-.30
(1995) (FDA).
263. See supra notes 19,26-27 and accompanying text (describing citizen petitions filed
with the FDA by pharmaceutical companies).
264. 5 U.S.C. § 551(3) (1994) (defining a "party" as "a person or agency named or
admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party
in an agency proceeding, and a person or agency admitted by an agency as a party for
limited purposes"); see also id. § 555(b) ("So far as the orderly conduct of public business
permits, an interested person may appear before an agency . ").
265. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988) (authorizing intervention before the FTC "upon
good cause shown"); 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1) (1988) (stating that the NRC "shall grant a
hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the [licensing]
proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding"); 47 U.S.C. §
309(d)(1) (1988) ("Any party in interest may file with the [FCC] a petition to deny any ap-
plication."); 49 U.S.C. § 10,328(b)(1) (1988) (stating that any "interested persons" may
intervene in ICC motor carrier licensing proceedings); 49 U.S.C.A. § 41,108(b) (West Supp.
1995) ("An interested person may file a response with the Secretary opposing ... the
issuance of [an air carrier] certificate."); see also Ecee, Inc. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 339, 350
(5th Cir. 1981) ("Administrative standing analysis must always begin with the language of
the statute and regulations that provide for an administrative hearing.").
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judicial review.' As the doctrine of Article III standing expanded,
reviewing courts required that agencies allow other interested parties
to participate in administrative proceedings.267 Notably, even when
the Supreme Court added the limitation that an interested party
arguably be within the "zone of interests" protected by a particular
statute, competitors continued to satisfy standing requirements even
where legislation appeared to be geared primarily toward protecting
consumers.2 1 Whether or not attributable to judicial prompting,
agencies generally permit intervention by a large class of potentially
266. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968) (holding that utility
with monopoly in relevant markets had standing to challenge TVA plan to sell power at
lower rates); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 83 (1958) (holding that
incumbent firm had standing to challenge new entry inconsistent with city ordinance); FCC
v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239, 245-46 (1943) (broadcast interference); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,476-77 (1940) (competing broadcaster); Philco Corp. v.
FCC, 257 F.2d 656, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (concerning manufacturer of electronic
equipment in competition with applicant for broadcast license), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946
(1959); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 547-49 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (noting
that existing station feared electrical interference from applicant for new radio station),
aff'd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943); cf. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386
U.S. 129, 135 (1967) (finding that interest in market competition was sufficient to support
intervention in civil litigation). But see Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479-80
(1938) (denying standing to competitors).
267. See, eg., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1002-05 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (finding that listening audience had sufficient interest to
support intervention in FCC licensing proceeding). Strictly speaking, the Constitution's
"case or controversy" language has no applicability to administrative bodies. Nonetheless,
if a party can satisfy the theoretically stricter requirements of Article III, it is not
surprising that courts would expect that such persons should be able to participate in an
agency proceeding, Gardner v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086,1090 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[A]gencies are
free to hear actions brought by parties who might be without party standing if the same
issues happened to be before a federal court."), especially since those persons would be
permitted to request judicial review of the agency's action, see National Welfare Rights
Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The right of judicial review cannot be
taken as fully realized... if appellants are excluded from participating in the proceeding
to be reviewed.").
268. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,620-21 (1971); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also Air Courier
Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 527-28 & n.5 (1991)
(distinguishing decisions in which competitors were held to be within the zone of interests);
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) ("[The test denies a right of
review if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress
intended to permit the suit."); Stewart, supra note 75, at 1733 ("It is difficult to construe
these two statutes as designed to protect firms with whom banks might potentially
compete. It is far more reasonable to regard their limitations as protecting bank customers
.... "); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1432, 1445-51 (1988) (discussing zone of interest requirement).
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interested persons,269 again to promote interests such as improved
access to potentially relevant information and enhanced legitimacy of
decisionmaking.27 °
Thus, almost any interested person will be able to participate in
rulemaking or adjudicatory proceedings before an agency. Although
perhaps not constitutionally required, Congress and the agencies
themselves have chosen to permit relatively unfettered public input
into administrative decisionmaking. Even if courts use the "zone of
interest" test to limit the standing of competitors absent some clear
indication in the statute that Congress meant to protect existing
businesses, this would only reduce the opportunity for judicial review
and not affect access to agency proceedings. It would be unrealistic,
therefore, to propose that agencies now close the doors to parties
wishing to protect their own economic self-interests. Indeed, it would
be difficult to argue that competitors in particular should be excluded
from agency proceedings; agencies and courts repeatedly have
accorded such entities the right to participate because, among all
potential third parties, they may have the most direct interest at stake
as well as the best information.27' In any event, competitors might
be able to circumvent any such limitation simply by filing their infor-
mation anonymously or possibly even through public interest or-
ganizations.2'
269. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1995) (NRC); 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (1995) (DOT)
(stating that criteria for intervention "will be liberally interpreted"); 16 C.F.R. § 3.14(a)
(1995) (FTC); 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(2)(ii) (1995) (FERC) (listing specific classes of
interested persons, including competitors); 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (1994) (FCC). Some agencies
also permit interested persons to petition for the modification, suspension or revocation
of a previously approved license. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (1995) (NRC).
270. See Nichols v. Board of Trustees of Asbestos Workers Local 24 Pension Plan, 835
F.2d 881, 897-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 606 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978). For additional background on the values promoted by
liberal intervention rules, see Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972); David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention
Before Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARv. L. REv. 721 (1968).
271. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
139 (1961) ("Indeed, it is quite probably people with just such a hope of personal
advantage who provide much of the information upon which governments must act.");
Juarez Gas Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 595, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that competitors
threatened with the loss of business are in a "position to advance matters which are
relevant and material for consideration" by the agency); supra notes 257, 266. But cf.
Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 346-48 (1984) (holding that consumers
could not seek review of USDA milk marketing orders).
272. Some may already do this for strategic reasons. See Formal Comment Period on
Food Additive Petitions Requested, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, July 6,1992, available in Westlaw,
Foodchemn file (suggesting that the tardy submission by the Center for Science in the
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3. Possibilities for Reform
In lieu of complete exclusion, agencies could limit the rights of
participation in a manner designed to minimize the risks of anticom-
petitive abuses. The significant variability across agencies would, of
course, make any uniform solutions problematic, but certain basic
types of reforms could be adapted to even very different agency
procedures. For example, intervention might be permitted only at a
particular stage in the proceedings and in such a way as not to delay
agency action. Courts have recognized that agencies possess
considerable latitude in restricting the scope of an intervenor's
participation in order to prevent dilatory tactics. 3 As the Supreme
Court once noted, "administrative proceedings should not be a game
or a forum to engage in unjustified obstructionism."'274 Moreover,
in what appears to be a little-noticed provision, the APA itself directs
agencies to take action on license applications with dispatch.275
Public Interest of old data about sucralose (a food additive awaiting FDA approval), data
that purportedly was received from an anonymous source, may have reflected bad faith
intervention by a company seeking to retain its competitive advantage in the market for
non-nutritive sweeteners).
273. See Waterway Communications Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 851 F.2d 401, 403 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (upholding FCC power to deny untimely requests for intervention); City of Angels
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 745 F.2d 656, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding FCC power to
deny intervention in comparative hearing); Bellotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380, 1382-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (upholding denial of intervention where it would expand the scope of
proceeding); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 627 F.2d 1313,1320-24 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (holding that the ICC could limit intervention to carriers that had genuine
competitive interests in license proceedings); National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429
F.2d 725, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (intervenor's role may be limited to avoid repetition and
delay); City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that the
number of intervenors may be capped).
274. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 533 (1978); see
also Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Whatever
the statutory restraints on the NRC's authority to exclude material issues from its hearings,
the Commission can certainly adopt a pleading schedule designed to expedite its
proceedings."); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (stating that although representatives of listening audience must
be permitted to intervene, the FCC need not "allow the administrative processes to be
obstructed or overwhelmed by captious or purely obstructive protests").
275. See 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1994) ("When application is made for a license required by
law, the agency, with due regard for the rights and privileges of all the interested parties
or adversely affected persons and within a reasonable time, shall set and complete
proceedings... and shall make its decision."); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253,
1261 n.25 (9th Cir. 1977) (interpreting § 558(c) as "requir[ing] any adjudicatory hearings
mandated under other provision of law to be set and completed in an expeditious and
judicious manner"); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE Acr 89-90 (1947) ("The import of this sentence is that an agency shall hear
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At present, however, many agencies halt proceedings or
otherwise delay final decisionmaking when a third party raises
objections.276 These procedures provide obvious invitations for
anticompetitive abuse,2' especially if objections may be filed in a
tardy or seriatim fashion.27 Indeed, intervention procedures may
represent political concessions to existing members of a regulated
industry as a tool for retarding market entry by potential com-
petitors.279 They may also reinforce an agency's reluctance to act
before all information has been considered; bureaucrats may be more
concerned with unimpeachable decisionmaking than with the speedy
resolution of matters.2°
and decide licensing proceedings as quickly as possible... . The requirement that licensing
proceedings be completed with reasonable dispatch is merely a statement of fair
administrative procedure.").
276. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 10,725,10,762(c)(3) (1988) (declaring that freight forwarder's
new rates may be suspended pending agency review if objections are submitted to the
ICC); Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 665 F. Supp. 1493, 1509-10 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(incumbent's intervention and objection to competitor's natural gas allocation request
prevented issuance of temporary certificate and delayed final FERC action by more than
one year), aff'd, 880 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1989); 50 Fed. Reg. 28,045 (1985) (incumbent
firm's objections to DEA registration delayed proceedings for almost two years).
277. See OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 71, at 20 ("[T]he peculiar nature of the
administrative process is to accentuate that delay and make the period of delay responsive
to the actions of the parties. In particular, any party disadvantaged by the prospective
decision is granted the right to delay that decision for many years."); Miller, supra note
43, at 904 ("[Hjealth care providers, like truckers, can attempt to manipulate entry barriers
by intervening in the administrative proceedings of their competitors.").
278. See WIXT Television, Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1003, 1026 (N.D.N.Y.
1980) (describing allegations in antitrust case that competitor's objections were "filed late
and with the intent of delaying the FCC proceeding"); FDA Delay in Sucralose Approval
Gets "Golden Grinch" Award from Sen. Matthews, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Aug. 29, 1994,
available in Westlaw, Foodchemn file (quoting Sen. Harlan Mathews as complaining that
" 'any third party could indefinitely delay approval of [a food] additive by simply
repeatedly submitting their interpretation of data' ").
279. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-10 & n.14
(1978) (upholding state statute giving existing automobile dealers notice and an
opportunity to comment on the applications submitted by new entrants, notwithstanding
automatic delays in approval of the applications); supra note 75 (discussing agency capture
hypothesis).
280. See, e.g., Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 191,217-18 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) ("FDA may find it difficult not to
be extremely cautious in approving new drugs .... [The prudent course for the FDA is
to delay and strive for maximum certainty."); OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 71, at
5 ("The agency usually cannot resist the effort to delay through exhaustion of process
because this would be grounds for reversal on appeal to the courts."); C. Frederick
Beckner, HI, Note, The FDA's War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529,551-53 (1993) (describing
substantial delays in the drug approval process).
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On occasion, agencies do limit the opportunities for intervention
in adjudicatory proceedings?8' When the FDA issued its orphan
drug approval regulations, for example, it rejected suggestions that it
create a preapproval challenge procedure because it feared that
incumbents might try thereby "to delay the marketing of competitors'
approvable" orphan drugs.' Earlier this year, DEA eliminated the
right of incumbents to demand a hearing on a competitor's application
to manufacture controlled substances.m As the Agency explained
when it first proposed this modification of its existing procedures:
[C]urrently registered manufacturers use the regulatory
hearing requirement to deter others from applying or to
delay entry of competitors into their marketplace. As often
as not, a company whose new application is opposed by a
current manufacturer retaliates by opposing the annual
renewal of the other's registration. This abuse of the
regulatory hearing requirement adversely affects competition
by delaying new registrations and results in the unnecessary
expenditure of DEA resources.... .'
281. See, eg., 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a) (1995) (NRC); 14 C.F.R. § 302.15 (1995) (DOT); 16
C.F.R. § 1025.17 (1995) (CPSC); 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b) (1995) (FERC); 46 C.F.R.
§ 502.72(b)(2) (1994) (FMC); 49 C.F.R. §§ 1112.4, 1113.7 (1994) (ICC); see also Gellhorn,
supra note 270, at 387-88 (describing limited forms of intervention).
282. 57 Fed. Reg. 62,076, 62,083 (1992) (adding that incumbents would remain free to
file citizen petitions to challenge approvals which allegedly impinged on their own
exclusivity rights). Similarly, although competitors are permitted to file protests in
response to motor carrier license applications, 49 C.F.R. § 1160.40-.43 (1994), they may do
so only after the ICC has first granted preliminary operating authority to the applicant.
Id. § 1160.5(b); see also American Transfer & Storage Co. v. ICC, 719 F.2d 1283, 1306 (5th
Cir. 1983) (finding that expedited procedures properly implement congressional intent to
liberalize entry requirements for certified carriers).
283. See 60 Fed. Reg. 32,099,32,101 (1995) (amending 21 C.F.R. pt. 1301). The agency
emphasized that, whether or not a hearing is held, current registrants and applicants would
still be permitted to submit comments or objections concerning an application for
registration. Id. at 32,100. Because the statute provided a right to demand a hearing on
an importer's application, however, DEA felt powerless to similarly revise its procedures
in that situation. Id.
284. 58 Fed. Reg. 52,246, 52,247 (1993); see also supra notes 24,28. For these reasons,
DEA originally proposed that incumbents could only request and not demand a hearing
on a competitor's application. Thereupon, in its supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking, the Agency proposed eliminating any opportunity for incumbent firms to
trigger a hearing on an application, though such firms would be allowed to participate in
any hearing requested by the applicant. See 59 Fed. Reg. 30,555 (1994) (reiterating its
earlier view that "registrants and applicants have abused the mandatory hearing
requirement in the past and it remains a future source of abuse where these individuals
deter or delay new registrations and retaliate by opposing annual renewals").
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Thus, some of the delaying tactics employed by Alpha in the drug
approval hypothetical set out in Part I may not be available to
pharmaceutical companies in the future.
Reducing the procedural impact of intervention represents one
particularly useful type of reform. In 1985, for example, the NRC
announced that it would no longer delay final decisions concerning
nuclear operating licenses to consider late objections unless they
raised substantial safety questions.' The Commission explained
that, in recent cases, it "has been confronted with the task of
addressing large numbers of allegations which were brought to its
attention very shortly before, and in some cases on the eve of, the
date on which a decision on whether to authorize the issuance of an
operating license was to be made.' '1 6 Nonetheless, agencies are not
free to ignore statutory rights of participation. When a person is
entitled to intervene in a proceeding, an agency must provide a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.' Legislative reforms may,
therefore, be required.
Deregulation may minimize both the opportunities and incentives
for sham petitioning. When Congress enacted the Motor Carrier Act
of 1980,' it reduced the burden of proof placed on common
carriers requesting certificates for motor or water transport of
property, requiring only that applicants demonstrate that their
proposed service "will serve a useful public purpose, responsive to
public demand or need." 9 The burden then falls to those persons
285. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,030 (1985).
286. Id. at 11,031 (adding that many of these allegations proved "to be unsubstantiated
or of little, if any, safety significance"); see also Manso, supra note 72, at 131-32 (describing
the proliferation of trivial objections that delayed operation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant); B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Nuclear Licensing: Innovation Through Evolution in
Administrative Hearings, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 497, 525-28 (1982) (urging revisions in NRC
procedures to eliminate the delays caused by late intervention and meritless objections).
It should be noted, however, that sham petitioning before the NRC appears to result from
the antinuclear agendas of various public interest organizations rather than the
anticompetitive machinations of rival utility companies.
287. See Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
288. Pub. L. No. 96-296,94 Stat. 793 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
For background on the Act, see American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 457-
59, 468-69 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); Tom B. Kretsinger, Jr., The
Motor Carrier Act of 1980: Report and Analysis, 50 UMKC L. REV. 21 (1981-82); Rene
Sacasas & Nicholas A. Glaskowsky, Jr., Motor Carrier Deregulation: A Decade of Legal
and Economic Conflict, 18 TRANSP. L.J. 189 (1990).
289. 49 U.S.C. § 10,922(b)(1)(B) (1988). Applicants must continue to demonstrate that
they are "fit, willing, and able" to provide that proposed service. Id. § 10,922(b)(1)(A);




who oppose the requested certificate to prove that the proposed
service would be "inconsistent with the public convenience and
necessity."2' In addition, the Act specifies that the ICC may not
find such an inconsistency based solely on the possible diversion of
revenue or traffic from an existing carrier, 9' and it also provides
that others cannot protest an application unless they are able and
willing to handle the traffic themselves or otherwise are granted
special leave to intervene.29
Prior to 1980, motor carrier applicants had to prove that their
proposed service would promote "public convenience and necessity,"
and other persons could raise objections largely without limitation.
Indeed, the antitrust claims in California Motor Transport arose out
of such proceedings.293 After passage of the Motor Carrier Act in
1980, protests to certificate applications have largely ceased.294 Of
course, the procedural reforms found in the Act coincided with (and
may well have been nothing more than an unintentional by-product
of) a much broader deregulatory initiative.29 The elimination of
exclusive licensing requirements would, for instance, largely eliminate
the need to conduct time-consuming comparative hearings of
competing applications. 96
290. 49 U.S.C. § 10,922(b)(1) (1988) (stating that parallel provisions apply to certificates
for motor carrier passenger services); see id. § 10,922(c)(1)(A); Trailways Lines, Inc. v.
ICC, 766 F.2d 1537, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1985). This burden is not easily satisfied. See, e.g.,
Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 724 F.2d 472, 478-80 (5th Cir. 1984); RTC Transp., Inc. v.
ICC, 708 F.2d 620,625-26 (11th Cir. 1983); Film Transit, Inc. v. ICC, 699 F.2d 298,301 (6th
Cir. 1983).
291. 49 U.S.C. § 10,922(b)(2)(B) (1988); see also J.H. Rose Truck Line, Inc. v. ICC, 683
F.2d 943, 950 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The Act specifically states that evidence directed at
financial disadvantage to competitors, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for denying
a certificate.").
292. 49 U.S.C. § 10,922(b)(7) (1988). Under no circumstances may a contract carrier
protest the application of a common carrier. Id. § 10,922(b)(8). Essentially identical
provisions apply to certificates for motor carrier passenger services, id. § 10,922(c)(7)&(8),
and motor contract carriers or freight forwarders, id. § 10,923(b)(4).
293. 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972).
294. See Letter from Henri F. Rush, General Counsel, ICC, to author (Nov. 8, 1994)
("In 1979, 8200 of 12,800 trucking applications were unopposed. By 1993,12,313 of 12,316
were unopposed.") (on file with author).
295. See H.R. REP. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2283, 2294-99; Erickson Transp. Co. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 1057, 1061-62, 1065
(8th Cir. 1984).
296. See Bradley Behrman, CivilAeronautics Board, in THE POLrrIcS OF REGULATION,
supra note 280, at 75, 114-15 (explaining that CAB route cases took an average of two
years because the Board accorded generous procedural rights to all applicants, incumbents,
and other interested persons).
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In those contexts where exclusive licensing is unavoidable, as
perhaps in the telecommunications field, or is considered necessary to
encourage innovation, as in the pharmaceutical industry, legislators
and regulators must ensure that opportunities for intervention are cir-
cumscribed so that incumbent firms cannot inappropriately inhibit
competition. In a few instances, Congress has enacted provisionsminimizing the opportunities for delay and anticompetitive
manipulation of intervention rights. For instance, in a 1983
amendment to the Federal Communications Act, it sought to
eliminate the practice of competing broadcasters to request, for
purposes of delay, oral hearings on routine license modification
proposals.297 The previous year, Congress authorized the NRC to
hold hearings on simple license modifications only after granting its
approval of those modifications so as to avoid unnecessary delays.29
Such procedural reforms should serve as a model and be adopted
more widely to better protect the integrity of the regulatory processes
of other agencies.
CONCLUSION
Whatever ultimately happens with the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's investigation of administrative petitioning activities in the
pharmaceutical and medical device industries, there does appear to be
a reasonable basis for fears that regulatory processes are being
manipulated by firms in these or other industries. As illustrated by
the Alpha Pharmaceutical Company hypothetical, drug manufacturers
can make use of a variety of administrative procedures to delay or
perhaps completely prevent market entry by potential competitors.
Notwithstanding the admitted difficulties in trying to gauge the
prevalence of such behavior, this Article has identified real oppor-
tunities for sham petitioning in administrative proceedings, especially
when market entry requires some sort of licensing.
The FTC's planned reliance on the federal antitrust laws is,
however, problematic for a number of reasons. The Sherman Act was
not designed to combat anticompetitive abuse of the regulatory
process, and the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington petitioning
297. See Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-214, § 4(a), 97 Stat. 1467 (1983) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 316 (1988)); H.R. REP. No.
356, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2219, 2231-32.
298. See NRC Authorization, Pub. L. No. 97-415, § 12, 96 Stat. 2067 (1982) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1988)); S. REP. No. 113, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3592, 3598-99.
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immunity provides too limited a mechanism for ensuring meaningful
antitrust scrutiny in this area. It is extremely difficult, for example,
to establish that a regulatory petition is both objectively baseless and
born of a subjective predatory intent. The constitutional right to
petition has created a wide safe harbor for questionable regulatory
submissions.
Because the antitrust laws cannot adequately deter anticom-
petitive abuses of the regulatory process, agency procedures may have
to be modified to address any such concerns. Indeed, even if antitrust
scrutiny provided some meaningful deterrent, procedural reforms
could respond to sham petitioning more directly and effectively. Just
as courts have developed special standards to govern the conduct of
litigants, agencies may need to assume greater responsibility for
controlling the behavior of participants in administrative proceedings.
Professional responsibility and certification rules have only limited
utility in deterring improper petitioning, so direct limitations on
opportunities to trigger delay will be necessary. Although agencies
permit and even encourage participation by persons with financial
interests in licensing and other decisions, neither the constitutional
right to petition nor guarantees of due process require that incumbent
firms be given opportunities that may be used to block market entry
by competitors.
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